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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON SMALL BUSINESS LENDING POLICIES IN THE U.S., 2010-2016 
By 
JOOWON JEONG 
August 2020 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Cathy Yang Liu 
Major Department: Public Management and Policy 
 
 
The three essays in this dissertation all focus on small business lending policies in the 
U.S. and make several unique contributions to the literature. The first essay provides a national 
overview of the small business sector; it focuses on establishment and employment trends, 
contributions to the national and local economy, major obstacles to small businesses (access to 
capital, in particular), and various governmental programs for small business lending.  
With a focus on the Small Business Administration (SBA)’s lending programs, the 
second essay examines whether SBA lending has a larger impact on counties with lower-income 
communities and/or those where the proportion of the black or Hispanic population is higher. 
Using a first-differenced two-stage least squares approach, this study finds consistent evidence 
that an increase in SBA loans has a positive effect on employment in lower-income counties, 
particularly where the proportion of the black population is higher. The findings support the 
credit-rationing argument that less developed financial markets such as those in lower-income or 
minority-concentrated communities should receive relatively higher benefits from governmental 
interventions in small business credit markets.  
The final essay links two different but closely related policies—the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) and SBA lending programs—and evaluates how the CRA influences 
SBA lending activity across and within the U.S. seven metropolitan areas. The CRA is a 1977 
federal law that encourages depository institutions to meet the credit needs of low- to moderate-
income (LMI) neighborhoods whose median family income is less than 80% of the area’s 
median family income. By taking advantage of this 80% or less income threshold, this study uses 
a regression discontinuity design. The overall results suggest that the CRA has an insignificant or 
(at best) a modest impact on SBA lending in LMI neighborhood, although there were some 
variations across central city, inner-ring suburbs and outer-ring suburbs in the metropolitan areas. 
Taken together, the three essays in this collection provide a comprehensive and nuanced 
understanding of small business lending programs in the U.S. Also, they provide important 
insights that may assist policy makers in tailoring SBA programs based on communities’ 
characteristics in a changing financial landscape.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Access to credit is crucial for small business startup, expansion, and survival because it 
enables small business to bring dynamic ideas, innovative services, and new products to the 
market (Cole & Sokolyk, 2016). However, small business owners often face considerably more 
difficulty obtaining credit than large business owners because they are relatively young and have 
little or no credit history (Craig, Jackson, & Thomson, 2009). In addition, limited access to credit 
for low-income and minority communities has been an ongoing concern in the U.S. for several 
decades (Avery, Bostic, & Canner, 2005; Bates & Robb, 2015, 2016; Cole & Sokolyk, 2016; 
Ding, Lee, & Bostic, 2018; Immergluck, 2002). 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was established in 1977 to address the credit 
needs of low- and moderate-income areas, including traditionally excluded minority 
communities (Bostic & Robinson, 2003). Federal loan guarantees, provided by the Small 
Business Administration (SBA), were created to encourage lenders to provide loans to small 
businesses that might otherwise not obtain financing with reasonable terms and conditions 
(Small Business Administration, 2018). Despite the relatively long history and substantial 
budgets of these programs, full knowledge of either their contributions to the economy or their 
problems and public policy concerns is lacking.  
In addition, during the Great Recession, the credit market in the U.S. and around the 
world collapsed, and small businesses that relied upon banks for credit were significantly 
impacted by the ensuing financial crisis (Wiersch & Shane, 2013). In response to this crisis, 
several laws were enacted to boost the availability of capital to small businesses. For example, 
the U.S. Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was enacted to provide the SBA with 
additional funding to subsidize SBA fees and increase the maximum loan guarantee of the loan 
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guarantee program to 90% (Cole, 2012). However, little is known about whether these 
government programs have contributed to the recovery of the small business sector.  
Accordingly, this dissertation examines whether government-guaranteed loan programs 
and federal policies for small business lending contributed to the expansion of economic 
opportunities to disadvantaged communities during recovery. In three separate but interrelated 
essays, this study analyzes how these policies have addressed the credit needs of small 
businesses. By using different methodological approaches and data sources for each essay, a 
comprehensive evaluation is provided of the small business sector and related programs and 
policies at three different administrative levels. 
The first essay provides a national overview of the small business sector; it focuses on 
establishment and employment trends, contributions to the national and local economy, major 
obstacles to small businesses (access to capital, in particular), and various governmental 
programs for small business lending. This essay does not contain an in-depth empirical analysis; 
instead, it aims to establish a context for further discussion on small business lending through the 
provision of background information on the small business sector and governmental lending 
programs.  
The second essay begins with an assumption that small businesses in low-income 
communities and/or communities with a high proportion of minorities are more likely to face 
credit rationing in the financial market. The SBA established loan programs to alleviate the 
financial constraints experienced by small businesses, particularly those in underserved 
communities, and to foster economic development and job creation. Therefore, using data from 
the SBA’s 7(a) and 504 lending programs and seven year-by-year county-level cohorts between 
2010 and 2016, the second essay examines whether SBA lending had a greater impact on 
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counties with low-income communities and/or those where the proportion of black and Hispanic 
populations is higher. 
The final essay links two different but closely related policies—the CRA and SBA 
lending programs—and evaluates how the CRA influences SBA lending activity in low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods, with a special focus on geographic distribution. Specifically, 
using seven metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that are representative of U.S. urban areas, this 
essay examines whether CRA-eligible neighborhoods have experienced higher SBA lending 
activity than CRA-ineligible neighborhoods and further analyzes how SBA lending activity has 
differed within and across MSAs.  
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2 AN OVERVIEW OF SMALL BUSINESS, ACCESS TO CREDIT, AND LENDING 
POLICIES 
Small businesses occupy an iconic place in policy debates in the U.S. Numerous and 
diverse public policies subsidize small businesses, and the political leaders of both parties voice 
their support for the sector. Part of this support is based on consensus that a healthy small 
business sector contributes to the local economy by bringing innovation, jobs, and growth to the 
communities in which the businesses are established. It is reasonable to expect then that 
shrinking or unsuccessful businesses threaten the stability of a community. However, recognition 
of this was slow to manifest in the world of public policies. Less than 50 years ago, little or no 
attention was paid to government statistical gathering or policy-making for small businesses 
(Ackermann, 2012). In 1976, using the Public Law 94-305, the U.S. Congress created an Office 
of Advocacy within the U.S. SBA (Small Business Administration, 2018). Among other things, 
it was asked to “examine the role of small business in the American economy and the 
contribution [that] small business [could] make in improving competition, encouraging economic 
and social mobility for all citizens, restraining inflation, spurring production, expanding 
employment opportunities, increasing productivity, promoting exports, stimulating innovation 
and entrepreneurship, and providing an avenue through which new and untested products and 
services can be brought to the marketplace” (U.S. SBA Office of Advocacy, 2018).   
Since then, the significance of small businesses to the U.S. economy, as well as their 
challenges and policy-related concerns, have been examined and documented. In particular, 
policy interest in the issue of access by small businesses to capital has increased owing to 
concerns that small businesses might be prevented from obtaining adequate credit to enable them 
to start, continue, expand, and create jobs (Ackermann, 2012). Although it has been argued that 
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the government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses, little is known 
about the effects of governmental lending programs in this regard. Information on the conditions 
of small business financing is scarce, which leaves important gaps in knowledge for policy-
makers. Therefore, this dissertation aims to address this gap by analyzing the impact of 
government policies on small business lending. Before discussing these issues in depth in 
Chapters 3 and 4, background information on the small business sector, access to credit, and 
lending policies is provided in Chapter 2.  
 
2.1 The size of a small business  
According to the SBA, a small business is a privately owned corporation, partnership, or 
sole proprietorship that has fewer employees and/or less annual revenue than a regular-sized 
business or corporation. However, it is not entirely clear how the size of a small business should 
be determined. The U.S. SBA provides guidance on the standards to use to gauge small business 
size; these are used to determine whether or not a firm is eligible for inclusion in an SBA 
business program and for financial assistance, as well as consideration in other governmental 
programs reserved for small business concerns. The SBA defines a business to be mostly small 
based on two widely used standards, which are either the number of employees over the past 12 
months or the average annual receipts over the past three years. A business (i.e., primarily in the 
manufacturing or mining industries) is considered small if it has 500 or fewer employees. A 
business in the non-manufacturing industry is considered small if it has average annual receipts 
of $7.5 million or less.   
Although there are many exceptions to these standards as they vary by industry, 
generally, using the North American Industry Classification System, the typical standard used to 
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determine the size of a small business for the purpose of research and statistics gathering is 500 
employees or less. According to the SBA definition, small businesses account for at least 80% of 
all U.S. businesses (Table 2.1). However, upon analyzing U.S. businesses by the size of their 
employees, it was established that half of all businesses have less than four employees. The 
number of establishments with fewer than 20 employees accounted for approximately 70% of all 
U.S. businesses. 
 
Table 2.1 Number of establishments by firm size 
Number of 
employees                                                  
2010 2015 
Number of establishments  % Number of establishments  % 
0–4 3,582,826 48 3,649,989 48 
5–9 982,019 13 1,016,287 13 
10–19 652,662 9 648,694 8 
20–99 648,386 9 697,870 9 
100–499 354,313 5 367,335 5 
500+ 1,176,422 16 1,283,763 17 
Total 7,396,628 100 7,663,938 100 
Source: The author’s calculations were based on the County Business Patterns Database (2010 and 2015) 
 
 
 
2.2 The importance of small businesses to the U.S. economy  
It is well-established that the small business sector is the largest source of job creation and 
wealth generation in the U.S. economy. Jane Jacobs (1961) famously argued that local small 
businesses are not only good for services and access to jobs but are also critical to the vitality of 
community life. According to Harvard Business Publishing’s 2014 report on small business 
lending, the small business sector employed half of the nation’s private sector workforce and 
created approximately two-thirds of net new jobs in the U.S between 2007 and 2012 (Mills & 
McCarthy, 2014). In addition, the SBA data demonstrated that small businesses created $5.9 
trillion, accounting for 44% of the non-farm U.S. economy in 2014 (Kobe & Schwinn, 2018).   
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Small businesses include employer firms and non-employer firms. According to the 2017 
Small Business Credit Survey, the majority of all business establishments in the U.S. are non-
employer firms, comprising 81% of all small businesses and employing 17% of the U.S. 
workforce (Federal Researve Banks, 2018). These firms generated $1.2 trillion in annual sales 
although this figure accounted for less than 4% of all sales and receipts nationally (Federal 
Researve Banks, 2018). Conversely, employer-led firms constituted about 20% of all small 
businesses but accounted for the remaining 96% of annual sales and receipts (Federal Researve 
Banks, 2018).  
 
2.3 Racial disparity in small business ownership  
As much as 99% of all minority-owned businesses are small firms with fewer than 500 
employees, but they accounted for 29% of all U.S. firms, according to the 2012 Survey of 
Business Owners (SBO). Specifically, there were 8.0 million minority-owned businesses in 
2012, up from 5.8 million in 2007, according to the findings of the 2007 and 2012 SBOs. This 
included a 35% increase in the number of black-owned firms, from 1.9 million to 2.6 million, 
and a 47% increase in the number of Hispanic-owned firms, from 2.3 million to 3.3 million, over 
this period.  
However, despite this growth, racial inequality has been identified regarding the 
allocation of business ownership. In 2012, the white population accounted for approximately 
63% of the U.S. population but owned 78% of all U.S. businesses, according to the SBO. By 
contrast, the black population represented roughly 13% of the U.S. population, but just 9% of all 
the U.S. businesses were black-owned in 2012. In addition, although Hispanic-owned businesses 
comprised 12% of all U.S. firms, the Hispanic population accounted for 15% of the U.S. 
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population in 2012. These statistics suggest that black or Hispanic populations across the country 
are disproportionately underrepresented as business owners compared to white populations.   
In addition to racial inequality in small business ownership, variations in geographical 
location have been identified between minority- and majority-owned businesses. Table 2.2 
shows the top 10 MSAs in terms of the number of establishments categorized according to the 
race/ethnicity of the owners. New York led the MSAs with approximately 1.5 million white-
owned businesses in 2012, followed by Los Angeles (904,320), Miami (700,609), Chicago 
(651,628), and Dallas (457,372). For black-owned businesses, New York had the largest number 
of establishments (250,890), followed by Atlanta (176,245), Chicago (134.564), Miami 
(125,451), and Washington (115,039). Miami led the MSAs with 423,163 Hispanic-owned 
businesses in 2012, followed by Los Angeles (393,051), New York (339,415), Houston 
(164,923), and Riverside (122,233). 
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Table 2.2 The top 10 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas according to the race/ethnicity of small 
business owners in 2012 
All Top 10 MSAs 
Number of 
establishments 
1 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area 2,202,062 
2 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area 1,484,137 
3 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Metro Area 904,056 
4 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL Metro Area 901,027 
5 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Metro Area 642,289 
6 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX Metro Area 606,867 
7 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA Metro Area 590,218 
8 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area 567,153 
9 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD Metro Area 482,165 
10 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA Metro Area 472,141 
White-
owned 
Top 10 MSAs 
Number of 
establishments 
1 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area 1,476,006 
2 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area 904,320 
3 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL Metro Area 700,609 
4 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Metro Area 651,628 
5 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Metro Area 457,372 
6 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX Metro Area 386,277 
7 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD Metro Area 376,045 
8 Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH Metro Area 374,771 
9 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area 347,520 
10 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA Metro Area 343,931 
Black-
owned  
Top 10 MSAs 
Number of 
establishments 
1 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area 250,890 
2 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA Metro Area 176,245 
3 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Metro Area 134,564 
4 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL Metro Area 125,451 
5 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area 115,039 
6 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX Metro Area 91,589 
7 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area 86,722 
8 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Metro Area 80,944 
9 Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI Metro Area 80,210 
10 Memphis, TN-MS-AR Metro Area 55,159 
Hispanic-
owned 
Top 10 MSAs 
Number of 
establishments 
1 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL Metro Area 423,163 
2 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area 393,051 
3 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metro Area 339,415 
4 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX Metro Area 164,923 
5 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA Metro Area 122,233 
6 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Metro Area 117,582 
7 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Metro Area 89,523 
8 San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX Metro Area 81,126 
9 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area 65,997 
10 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA Metro Area 62,753 
Note: MSA: metropolitan statistical area 
Source: 2012 Survey of Business Owners 
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2.4 Racial disparity in access to capital  
Despite the substantial number of small businesses and their considerable contribution to the 
economy, the risk of these businesses failing is surprisingly high. According to data from the 
2017 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, roughly 20% of all small businesses fail within their first 
year. By the end of their fifth year, 50% of small businesses have to liquidate. After 10 years, the 
survival rate drops to 35%. While there are a variety of reasons for the failure of small 
businesses, one of the most important reasons is financial constraint (Bates, 2010; Porter, 2015). 
Based on the findings of the 2017 Small Business Credit Survey, 64% of employer firms 
experienced financial challenges in the prior 12 months (Federal Researve Banks, 2017). Non-
employer firms reported less financial stability than employer firms. Having to meet operating 
expenses and access credit were cited as top financial challenges (Federal Researve Banks, 
2017).  
The survival and growth of small businesses depends on access to credit because 
appropriate levels of working capital investment ensures that businesses are able to grow more 
rapidly, hire more workers, and make more investments than those without it (Alon, Berger, 
Dent, & Pugsley, 2018). According to the 2018 SBCS, 87% of small employer firms applied for 
a loan or line of credit in 2017. Of these applications, business loans, lines of credit, and SBA 
loans/lines of credit equated to 47%, 43%, and 26%, respectively. The 60% of all small 
businesses needed credit at some point in 2017 but did not apply for it for a variety of reasons. 
Particularly, 20% of the respondents were discouraged from applying for a loan because they 
thought that the lender would not approve their application. Also, of the small businesses that 
applied, 23% did not obtain any financing, and 54% applicants received less than the amount 
requested. This indicates that obtaining bank credit is difficult, though not necessarily 
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impossible, for many small businesses. Other surveys have demonstrated that being granted 
access to credit is difficult for small business. For example, the Kauffman Firm Survey, which is 
the largest longitudinal study of new businesses ever embarked upon, tracked access to credit by 
a number of businesses that began operating in 2004 and found that approximately 30% of them 
did not obtain all or any of the amount requested as capital (Galope, 2016).  
However, it has been demonstrated that racial groups rely on different sources of financial 
capital. Specifically, white-owned small businesses mostly depend on business loans from banks, 
whereas black- and Hispanic-owned businesses rely on personal and family savings as a source 
of startup capital, despite the fact that the wealth levels of blacks and Hispanics are less than one 
tenth those of non-Hispanic whites (Robb, 2018). The most feasible explanation is that black and 
Hispanic businesses are less likely than white businesses to receive approval for a business loan, 
while the loans that are approved and extended by financial institutions are much smaller than 
those offered to white business owners (Bates, Bradford, & Jackson, 2018). For example, 
according to the findings of the 2016 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, nearly 60% of black-
owned businesses and 53% of Hispanic-owned businesses did not apply for a loan because they 
thought that the lender would not approve their application, compared to fewer than 10% of 
white-owned businesses. This indicates that black- and Hispanic-owned businesses have more 
limited access to capital relative to their white counterparts.  
  Lack of access to credit by small businesses is problematic because if credit is 
unavailable, small businesses may be unable to meet the current demands of their business or 
take advantage of opportunities for growth. In particular, historic racial bias and discrimination 
impacts nearly every step of the process of obtaining a loan, and this inequality negatively and 
significantly influences the amount and type of financial capital that minority-owned business 
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typically seek and are awarded (Bates et al., 2018). Minority-owned businesses are often forced 
to rely heavily on personal funds to finance a business (U.S. SBA Office of Advocacy, 2018). 
Consequently, this can deplete their assets even further by damaging their credit scores and 
inhibiting their business prospects (U.S. SBA Office of Advocacy, 2018).  While there is no 
comprehensive and conclusive solution to identifying ways to promote the success of small 
businesses (minority-owned businesses, in particular), one thing is certain—addressing the 
financial needs of small businesses is critical to the successful development of the small business 
sector.  
 
2.5 Government programs that expedite access to credit by small businesses  
To increase access to credit by small businesses, the creation and implementation of 
governmental programs is essential because the risk of allowing market dynamics to determine 
the fate of the entrepreneurial economy is substantial, and there is too much at stake (Craig, 
Jackson, & Thomson, 2008). In particular, small businesses in minority and low-income 
communities require special attention because they have experienced historical exclusion from 
important sectors of the economy (Bates & Robb, 2013). Many governmental initiatives are 
available; however, the focus of the current study is on the small business lending programs 
offered by the CRA and the SBA.  
 
2.5.1 Lending Programs Offered by the Community Reinvestment Act  
As a result of the neighborhood movement of the 1970s and 1980s, when community 
groups rallied against the historical practices of housing and banking discrimination in low-
income urban neighborhoods, the CRA was enacted to encourage depository financial 
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institutions to help meet the credit needs of communities (Getter, 2020). The CRA was asked to 
address a discriminatory practice called “redlining,” which had been used to deny or increase the 
cost of loans to low-income and minority borrowers in the market for housing credit 
(Immergluck, 2002). Since its introduction in 1977, the legislation has undergone several 
amendments. In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institution Reform and Recovery Act, 
which required the public disclosure of banks’ CRA ratings and performance evaluations to 
ensure that the CRA was more transparent (Laderman & Reid, 2010). In 1995, the CRA was 
asked to revise and expand its coverage to include small business lending, clarify performance 
standards, and reduce the compliance burden of banks (Getter, 2020). In 2005, it was revised 
once more again with a view to encouraging banks to meet the needs of community development 
outside MSAs (Getter, 2020).  
The CRA requires commercial banks and savings institutions with total assets of $1 
billion or more to collect and report data on their small business and community development 
lending (Department of the Treasury, Federal Research System, & Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2016). The small business lending data reported by the CRA provide useful 
information, such as the loans originated or purchased, even though they are less comprehensive 
than the data reported on home mortgage lending. According to the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, the number of applicants awarded loans and the small business loan 
amounts awarded by the CRA between 2010 and 2016 increased substantially (Table 2.3). 
Specifically, the total number of small business loans extended increased by approximately 45% 
from 4,215,201 in 2010 to 6,106,355 in 2016. Over the same period, the total monetary value of 
the loans awarded increased by 31% from $175 billion to $229 billion. Table 2.3 also shows that, 
on average, small loans under $100,000 accounted for 90% or more of the total number of small 
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business loans. This result is consistent with the findings of the 2017 SBCS, which demonstrated 
that 55% of the respondents in the survey/applicants sought a loan for less than $100,000. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Trends regarding small business loans originating from the CRA, by size of loan, 
2010–2016 
 Size of loan (dollars)  
Loans to firms 
with revenues of 
1 million or less 
 Number of loans  
 
All loans 
$100,000 or 
less 
$100,001 to 
$250,000 
More than 
$250,000 
 
FY 2010 4,215,201 3,884,656 162,220 168,325  1,489,952 
FY 2011 4,975,397 4,619,301 173,692 182,404  2,228,573 
FY 2012 5,073,468 4,701,118 177,806 194,544  2,232,045 
FY 2013 4,868,494 4,485,831 182,192 200,471  2,364,710 
FY 2014 5,435,934 5,056,712 185,224 193,998  2,539,316 
FY 2015 5,854,272 5,465,172 189,393 199,707  3,063,951 
FY 2016 6,106,355 5,698,559 202,118 205,678  3,052,400 
 Amount of loans (thousands of dollars)   
 
All loans 
$100,000 or 
less 
$100,001 to 
$250,000 
More than 
$250,000 
 Loans to firms 
with revenues of 
1 million or less 
FY 2010 174,817,839 55,626,585 28,578,781 90,612,473  64,579,050 
FY 2011 192,451,093 63,611,315 30,579,422 98,260,356  72,665,454 
FY 2012 198,636,959 62,461,481 31,192,989 104,982,489  73,476,902 
FY 2013 204,129,141 63,514,996 31,989,670 108,624,475  74,496,089 
FY 2014 208,009,395 70,335,717 32,392,447 105,281,231  73,146,672 
FY 2015 219,703,482 77,918,057 33,149,498 108,635,927  80,607,743 
FY 2016 229,278,587 82,581,474 35,116,408 111,580,705  81,274,583 
Note: Small business loans are defined as those whose original amounts are $1 million or less and were reported to 
be either loans secured by nonfarm or nonresidential real estate or commercial and industrial loans in Part I of the 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Schedule RC-C, Part II). 
Source: 2018 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  
 
2.5.2 Lending Programs Offered by the Small Business Administration  
The SBA, established in 1953, has provided support to entrepreneurs and small businesses in 
various forms, such as the provision of assistance to small businesses seeking to obtain a loan 
(U.S. SBA Office of Advocacy, 2018). The SBA does not lend money directly to small business 
owners but works with lenders to provide loans to them by setting guidelines for loans made from 
partnering with lenders, community development organizations, and micro-lending institutions (U.S. 
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SBA Office of Advocacy, 2018). In particular, by providing lenders with a guarantee that the SBA will 
pay off the federally guaranteed portion of the loan balance in the event of the borrower defaulting on 
the loan, the SBA reduces the risk to lenders and makes it easier for small businesses to acquire loans 
(U.S. SBA Office of Advocacy, 2018). In addition, the SBA’s loan programs are generally 
characterized by lower rates and fees, lower down payments, and more flexible overhead 
requirements compared to non-guaranteed loans (U.S. SBA Office of Advocacy, 2018).  
While the SBA offers several lending programs to small businesses who cannot otherwise obtain 
credit on reasonable terms and who do not have other sources of financing, the 7(a) Loan Program is its 
flagship program because it provides invaluable assistance on how to finance working capital, 
refinance debt, or buy a business, real estate, or equipment (U.S. Small Business Administration, 2016). 
The SBA 504 Loan Program is another prominent program that covers long-term financing and can be 
used to acquire and improve major fixed assets, such as owner-occupied real estate or heavy equipment 
(U.S. Small Business Administration, 2016). Compared to the 7(a) Loan Program, the 504 Loan 
Program places a greater emphasis on community development because it requires that the small 
businesses uses its funds to create or retain at least one job for every $65,000 that is guaranteed by the 
SBA (Congressional Research Service, 2018). In addition, under the 504 Loan Program, the relevant 
bank partners with a certified development company (CDC), which is a specialized SBA-
certified nonprofit corporation, to finance the small business (Congressional Research Service, 
2018). Each partner extends a loan to the qualifying small business, and typically, the CDC loan 
is backed by a 100% SBA-guaranteed debenture (Congressional Research Service, 2018).  
The details of the SBA lending program have changed several times over the last few 
decades, but a notable change was made during the 111th congress. Several pieces of legislation 
governing small businesses were passed to revive these firms during the recession. For example, 
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the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended an additional $730 million to 
the SBA to temporarily subsidize the latter’s fees and increase the maximum loan guarantee 
percentage of the 7(a) Loan Program to 90% (Congressional Research Service, 2019). The 
following year, the Small Business Jobs Act approved a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit 
Initiative to provide funding to extend the SBA’s fee subsidies and the 7(a) Loan Program’s offer 
of a  maximum loan guarantee up to 90% until December 31, 2010 (Congressional Research 
Service, 2019). This initiative was extended again until March 4, 2011, by the Continuing 
Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act of 2011 (Congressional Research 
Service, 2019)      
Table 2.4 shows a trend that reflects an increase in the number of loans extended or in the 
monetary value of the loans obtained through the 7(a) loan program between 2010 and 2016, 
although a decline in both these areas was observed in 2012. Specifically, from 2010 through to 
2016, the number of loans acquired through the 7(a) loans program increased by 36%, and the 
gross amount approved nearly doubled.  
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Table 2.4 The number of loans extended and the monetary value of SBA-guaranteed loans, 
2010–2016 
 7(a) Loan Program 504 Loan Program 
 
Number of approved 
loans 
Gross amount approved 
(in US$, billions) 
Number of approved 
loans 
Gross amount approved 
(in US$, billions) 
FY 2010 46,922 ---  12.4 --- 7,833 ---  4.5 --- 
FY 2011 53,688 14.4% 19.7 58.9% 7,676 -2.0% 4.6 2.2% 
FY 2012 44,358 -17.4% 14.3 -27.4% 7,047 -8.2% 4.5 -2.2% 
FY 2013 46,389 4.6% 18.1 26.6% 7,708 9.4% 5.3 17.8% 
FY 2014 52,044 12.2% 19.4 7.2% 5,885 -23.7% 4.3 -18.9% 
FY 2015 63,460 21.9% 23.9 23.2% 5,787 -1.7% 4.4 2.3% 
FY 2016 64,074 1.0% 24.5 2.5% 5,893 1.8% 4.8 9.1% 
Source: Small Business Administration (2018)  
 
By contrast, the number of loans extended through the 504 loan program was 
demonstrated to decrease between 2010 and 2015. In 2016, the figures bounced back slightly but 
did not recover to the 2010 levels. While there were fluctuations in the gross amount approved 
for loans obtained through the 504 loan program, an increase in this regard of approximately 7% 
was observed between 2010 and 2016. Compared to the number of loans acquired through the 
504 loans program, the number of loans obtained through the 7(a) loans program grew 
substantially, both in terms of the number of loans extended and their monetary value. This may 
be explained, in part, by the revised legislations governing the SBA’s fees and the increase in the 
maximum loan guarantee percentage (i.e., up to 90%) under the 7(a) loan program. 
 
2.6 Discussion  
Small businesses make a vital contribution to economic competitiveness in the U.S. Not 
only do they employ half of the nation’s workforce in the private sector, they have also created 
two-thirds of net new jobs in the country. However, as demonstrated by the findings of recent 
surveys, many small businesses fail, and this is primarily due to financial constraints. In 
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particular, minority-owned businesses are disproportionally and negatively impacted by a lack of 
access to credit, without which it is difficult for businesses to stabilize their income streams and 
take advantage of growth opportunities. This has considerable negative consequences for the 
entire U.S. economy. Therefore, from a policy perspective, it is important to address barriers to 
the entry and expansion faced by many small businesses. To increase access to credit by small 
businesses, the government has implemented various small business lending policies. This 
dissertation focuses on the lending programs of the CRA and the SBA. These are discussed in 
detail in the chapters that follow. 
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3 THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT-GUARANTEED SMALL 
BUSINESS LENDING  
 
Abstract 
Small businesses in lower-income communities and/or communities with a higher 
proportion of minorities are more likely to face credit rationing in the financial market. The 
Small Business Administration (SBA) established loan programs to alleviate the financial 
constraints experienced by small businesses, particularly those in underserved communities, and 
to foster economic development and job creation. Using data from the SBA’s 7(a) and 504 
lending programs and the seven-year county panels from 2010 to 2016, this study therefore 
sought to determine whether SBA lending had a larger impact on counties with lower-income 
communities and/or those where the proportion of the black or Hispanic population was higher. 
Overall, the study provides consistent evidence that an increase in SBA loans had a positive 
effect on employment in lower-income counties, particularly where the proportion of the black 
population was higher. Furthermore, the study finds that the effects of SBA 504 loans on 
employment were larger than those of SBA 7(a) loans. The findings support the credit-rationing 
argument that less developed financial markets such as those in lower-income or minority-
concentrated communities should receive relatively higher benefits from governmental 
interventions in small business credit markets.  
 
Keywords: Small Business Administration (SBA), guaranteed loans, employment, minority, low 
income, moderate-income 
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3.1 Introduction 
Access to credit is crucial for the initiation, expansion, and survival of small businesses 
and enables them to bring dynamic ideas, innovative services, and new products to the market 
(Bates & Robb, 2013; R. Cole & Sokolyk, 2016). However, small businesses often face greater 
difficulty securing credit than large businesses because they are relatively young and have little 
or no credit history (Craig et al., 2009; Robb, 2018). Moreover, small businesses in underserved 
communities where income levels are lower and/or the proportion of minority populations is 
higher have traditionally been considered unattractive customers by risk-averse financial 
institutions (Bates & Robb, 2016). The literature suggests that the problems associated with 
asymmetrical information between financial institutions and small businesses may be one of the 
mechanisms behind the failure of the financial market to allocate sufficient credit to these 
communities (Bates et al., 2018; Higgins, Lacombe, Stenard, & Young, 2020). To alleviate the 
issue of information asymmetry and foster economic development and job creation, the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) established loan programs. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that there should be a relationship between SBA-guaranteed lending and economic growth and 
development, particularly in lower-income and minority communities (Craig et al., 2009). 
Federal loan guarantees provided by the SBA encourage lenders to provide loans to small 
businesses that might not otherwise be able to obtain financing with reasonable terms and 
conditions. The two largest SBA programs are the 7(a) and 504 loan programs. The SBA’s 7(a) 
loans are the more common of the two; they can extend up to $5 million and are used to finance 
working capital, pay debts, or refinance/purchase businesses, real estate, or equipment (U.S. 
SBA, 2018), while the SBA’s 504 loans are used to finance commercial real estate or large 
equipment used in business operations, with funding ranging from $125,000 to $20 million (U.S. 
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SBA, 2018). Another difference between the 504 and 7(a) programs is that the 504 programs are 
more focused on economic development via job creation and retention than the 7(a) programs 
(Immergluck & Mullen, 1998). 
The SBA’s guaranteed lending programs, particularly the 7(a) program, have grown in 
terms of both the number of loans and the total loan value. According to the 2018 SBA loan 
program performance report for the fiscal years 2010 and 2016, while the dollar value of 504 
loans increased by approximately 4 percent from $4.5 billion to $4.7 billion, the number of 504 
loans decreased. By way of contrast, in the fiscal year 2016, the dollar value of 7(a) loans 
approved by the SBA was $24.5 billion, which constituted a 108 percent increase over the $12.4 
billion for the fiscal year 2010, and the number of 7(a) loans increased by 37 percent from 
46,922 to 64,074 over the same period. This growth in the SBA loan programs raises questions 
as to whether the benefits of the programs exceed their costs and whether society’s decision to 
subsidize credit to support small businesses is good for society as well as business owners 
(Craig, Jackson, & Thomson, 2007; Higgins et al., 2020; Y. S. Lee, 2018; Ramsey, 2018). 
The literature on small business lending is sparser than that on mortgage lending (Bostic 
& Lee, 2017) and has, for the most part, developed into two lines of study. The first relates 
discriminatory practices that limit access to bank loans based on individual characteristics, 
including race or class, and redlining, which refers to discrimination on the basis of geographic 
location (Bates, 2010; Bates et al., 2018; Bates & Robb, 2016; Immergluck, 2002; Immergluck 
& Mullen, 1998). Previous studies offer consistent evidence on this matter—in particular, 
showing that minority business owners face higher loan denial rates, higher interest rates, and a 
higher likelihood of being discouraged from applying for loans than white-owned businesses 
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(Mijid & Bernasek, 2013). Additionally, firms located in minority or low-income neighborhoods 
are penalized for their locations when seeking loans (Bates et al., 2018). 
The second line of research focuses on the impacts of small business lending on local 
economic growth (Cortes, 2010; Craig et al., 2007, 2008, 2009; Doctors & Wokutch, 1979; Y. S. 
Lee, 2018; Rupasingha, Crown, & Pender, 2018). However, the economic effects of small 
business loans delineated in the literature are ambiguous. Some studies maintain that SBA-
guaranteed lending programs bring positive social benefits, including growth in per capita 
income and in employment at a local market level (Brown & Earle, 2017; Cortes, 2010; Craig et 
al., 2007, 2008). In contrast, others argue that SBA-guaranteed lending programs have little 
effect in terms of improving income or employment in the areas that receive these loans (De 
Rugy, 2007; Higgins et al., 2020; Y. S. Lee, 2018; Rupasingha et al., 2018).  
While prior literature provides some insights into the economic effects of SBA loans, it 
has limitations. First, although the SBA’s 7(a) and 504 programs differ in many ways, most 
previous studies examined the aggregate effects of SBA programs instead of estimating the 
effects separately by program (Brown & Earle, 2017; Higgins et al., 2020; Y. S. Lee, 2018). The 
aggregate estimates may therefore mask the effects of SBA 504 loans by overrepresenting SBA 
7(a) loans because SBA 504 loans account for only a small proportion (approximately 10%) of 
total SBA loans. Second, although economic conditions in communities have changed rapidly 
over the decades, the literature mostly focuses on examining the effects of SBA loans during the 
1990s and 2000s, even in recent research (Brown & Earle, 2017; Eesley & Lee, 2019; Higgins et 
al., 2020). This study therefore investigates whether counties with a greater volume of small 
business loans, which is indicative of more financial capital flowing to small businesses in 
communities, had higher levels of employment between 2010 and 2016. In particular, by 
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separately estimating the effects of SBA loans by program, this study tests whether counties with 
a greater volume of SBA 504 loans, which place greater emphasis on employment growth and 
job retention, had better economic outcomes during this period.  
Third, although some studies examine the effects of SBA lending by community 
characteristics, the scope has been limited to the low–high-income continuum (Cortes, 2010; 
Craig et al., 2007). To the best of my knowledge, no study has investigated the effects of SBA 
lending on minority communities. Accordingly, this study examines whether SBA lending has 
had a greater impact on counties with lower-income communities or a higher proportion of 
minority populations, particularly blacks and Hispanics. Furthermore, since low-income and 
minority communities often intersect, giving rise to compounded or double discrimination, this 
study further examines the employment effects of SBA loans on low-income minority 
communities.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the economic 
rationale provided for government interventions in the small business credit market, briefly 
discusses the two largest SBA-guaranteed lending programs (the 7[a] and 504), and reviews the 
literature on the effects of SBA-guaranteed lending on local economic performance. Section 3.3 
describes the data and methods used in the study, while Section 3.4 discusses the findings on the 
effects of SBA lending on employment. A summary of the major findings, potential policy 
implications, and limitations of this study are offered in Section 3.5. 
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3.2 Background and Literature Review  
3.2.1 Economics of Government Interventions in the Small Business Credit Market  
In a complete capital market, firms should be able to borrow enough capital as long as 
they pay reasonable interest rates. In practice, however, small business owners often complain of 
not being able to secure sufficient credit, even if they are willing to pay higher interest rates. 
Economic theorists have suggested several mechanisms to explain the failure of the private 
sector to allocate loans efficiently. In their 1981 article, Stiglitz and Weiss argued that difficulties 
in obtaining adequate information about the parties involved in a transaction may explain the 
inefficient allocation of small business loans. Specifically, lenders are concerned about the 
interest rates they receive on loans and the risks associated with those loans. Lenders who raise 
their interest rates may suffer from adverse selection because higher interest rates increase the 
loan risk by either discouraging safer borrowers or inducing borrowers to invest in high-risk 
projects. Accordingly, lenders may choose not to raise interest rates in order to eliminate excess 
demand, resulting in the possibility of credit rationing. Higher interest rates tend to change the 
behavior of borrowers because they decrease the return on the project but increase payoffs, even 
if the project succeeds, resulting in moral hazards. In that sense, SBA loan guarantees may 
alleviate the adverse selection problem by providing lower interest rates, which in turn increase 
the share of safer borrowers, thus increasing the lender’s expected return and reducing expected 
losses when borrowers default on loan repayments (Craig et al., 2009). Additionally, to the 
extent that SBA loans guarantee lower interest rates, they help mitigate the moral hazard 
problem by making the loans more affordable and thus reducing the likelihood of defaults (Craig 
et al., 2009). The existence of credit rationing in small business credit markets therefore justifies 
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the existence of government-sponsored programs aimed at improving small businesses access to 
credit. 
In a similar vein, there is substantial literature on discriminatory lending practices, 
particularly those based on racial and geographic characteristics (Bates et al., 2018; Bates, 
Lofstrom, & Servon, 2011; Bates & Robb, 2014; Immergluck, 2002). These studies contended 
that minority business owners are more likely to be turned down for a loan than white business 
owners, and banks tend to give smaller loans to businesses located in certain communities. One 
line of research provided a theory of race-based discrimination using the concept of cultural 
proximity (Aaronson, Bostic, Huck, & Townsend, 2004; Fisman, Paravisini, & Vig, 2017). The 
theory emphasizes the importance of shared codes, languages, religions, and/or cultures between 
potential transactional parties. In particular, the theory describes how commonalities in ethnic 
origin increase the likelihood that a transaction will take place and its outcome. Due to this 
cultural proximity, lenders, who are predominately white, may be reluctant to provide loans to 
minority business owners. On the other hand, Lang and Nakamura (1993) provide a theory of 
redlining based on incomplete information, explaining that there is a higher loan denial rate in 
lower-income areas because lenders receive few applications from lower-income neighborhoods, 
and they have little information about how to evaluate applications from these areas. Such 
redlining and discrimination based on race also justifies the government-guaranteed loan 
programs in that SBA lending aims to provide loans to small businesses that might not otherwise 
be able to obtain financing with reasonable terms and conditions. 
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3.2.2 The Small Business Administration Loan Program  
The SBA, established in 1953, provides support to entrepreneurs and small businesses in 
various forms, which can be summarized as the “3 Cs” of capital, contracts, and counseling (U.S. 
SBA, 2020). SBA loans account for a significant proportion of the SBA’s activities. SBA loans 
are made through banks, credit unions, and other lenders that partner with the SBA and provide 
lenders with a guarantee that the agency will pay off the federally guaranteed portion of the 
remaining loan balance if a borrower defaults on the loan. As the SBA’s flagship program, the 
7(a) loans program aims to help small businesses that cannot obtain bank credit with reasonable 
terms and do not have other sources of financing. The funds can be used as working capital, to 
refinance debt, or to buy a business, real estate, or equipment. The interest rate on 7(a) loans can 
be adjustable based on negotiations between the lender and the borrower. Collateral is required, 
but the SBA guarantee cannot be a substitute for collateral. 
As another prominent program, the SBA 504 loan program aims to promote economic 
development by creating and retaining jobs in communities. The program provides small 
businesses with long-term financing to acquire and improve major fixed assets such as owner-
occupied real estate or heavy equipment. However, unlike 7(a) loans, 504 loans cannot be used 
as working capital or for inventory; the interest rate is fixed, and no outside collateral is required. 
In most cases, a business must create or retain one job for every $65,000 guaranteed by the SBA 
($100,000 per job for small manufacturers). Borrowers must also include projections for meeting 
these requirements during the loan application process. 
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3.2.3 Economic Impacts of Small Business Administration Programs  
As discussed, the primary goal of SBA lending programs is to mitigate market 
incompleteness by improving entrepreneurs’ access to credit and to promote local economic 
growth by helping establish viable small businesses. It is therefore reasonable to expect that if 
SBA lending programs have performed as planned, there should a positive relationship between 
the programs and economic growth. However, the evidence in the literature is not conclusive 
because some studies find that SBA programs are positively associated with local economic 
growth whereas others find that the programs failed to deliver positive outcomes. Indeed, that 
there is mixed evidence in the literature is not surprising. As Brown and Earle (2017) asserted, 
the relationship between SBA loans and the labor market is theoretically ambiguous because 
easier access to capital may enable expansion, thereby increasing employment and income 
levels, if they are gross complements. However, increased capital may also reduce employment 
if capital and labor are gross substitutes.    
In an earlier study, Doctors and Wokutch (1979) investigated the geographical patterns of 
SBA lending activity in nine metropolitan areas, namely, Pittsburgh, Miami, Chicago, Boston, 
St. Louis, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Houston, and Seattle. Comparing the number and value of SBA 
loans issued in these metropolitan areas between 1968 and 1976 in a descriptive way, they found 
that there was higher lending activity in areas with a higher share of small businesses and argued 
that the findings were contrary to the SBA’s purpose of providing credit to regions with the most 
need. However, I disagree with Doctors and Wokutch (1979)’s assertion that their findings 
conflict with the SBA’s purpose because more small businesses in a community may represent a 
greater demand for credit and more government-guaranteed small business loans (Y. S. Lee, 
2018). 
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Using more rigorous empirical strategies, recent studies have examined the effects of 
SBA lending programs on local and regional economic performance (Brown & Earle, 2017; 
Cortes, 2010; Craig, Jackson, & Thomson, 2006; Craig et al., 2007, 2008, 2009; Higgins et al., 
2020; Y. S. Lee, 2018). Some studies analyzed the total SBA lending, including the 7(a) and 504 
programs, but others only focused on estimating the effects of the 504 programs on local 
economic performance because the 504 program is more directly tied to local economic 
development. As Table 1 shows, some studies find that SBA lending is positively associated with 
local economic performance, mostly measured as per capita income or employment, while others 
find no significant growth in income or employment as a result of the programs. For example, a 
series of articles by Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006, 2007, 2008) used 1991–2002 SBA 
loans data to determine whether SBA programs produced net social benefits. The overall 
findings indicate that SBA lending activity levels were positively associated with employment 
growth or per capita income at a local market level during the study period, while the effects of 
SBA programs varied depending on community characteristics, such as location, size, industrial 
composition, and economic conditions. More specifically, the studies show that SBA lending 
activity levels are positively associated with the employment rate, and the relationship was 
observed more strongly in low-income neighborhoods than in high-income neighborhoods. 
These findings infer that SBA loan guarantees indeed provide benefits to small business owners 
in low-income neighborhoods by alleviating market imperfections.  
Cortes (2010) examines the relationship between SBA 504 lending activity levels and 
economic performance, such as income growth, small firm growth, and employment growth, 
using state-level data for the 1986–2008 period. The study findings show that SBA loans had a 
positive impact on the growth of small businesses and the number of workers employed in small 
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firms during this period. Brown and Earle (2017) also observed the positive impact of increased 
capital access on employment and affirmed that capital and labor are gross complements rather 
than substitutes.  
 
Table 3.1 Summary of key literature on SBA lending  
Author 
(year) 
Economic 
Performance  
Time 
period 
Unit of 
analysis 
Analytic Method Does SBA lending lead 
to greater economic 
performance? 
Craig et al., 
(2006, 2007) 
Per capita income 1991-
2002 
MSA OLS fixed effects 
model with 
instrumental 
variable  
Yes, but effects vary 
by community 
characteristics 
Craig et al., 
(2008) 
Employment rate 1991-
2002 
MSA Arellano-Bond 
panel model with 
instrumental 
variable 
Yes, greater impact in 
low income area 
Cortes 
(2010) 
Per capita income; 
Employment rate; 
Small business 
growth 
1986-
2008 
State OLS fixed effects 
model with 
instrumental 
variable 
Mixed – the effects on 
income are negative, 
but the effects on 
employment are 
positive. Fails to find a 
greater impact in low 
income area   
Lee (2018) Log employment; 
Log wage;  
Log payroll  
1993-
2002 
MSA First difference 
model with 
instrumental 
variable  
No significant 
employment or income 
growth effects from 
small business loans 
Brown & 
Earl (2017) 
Employment rate 1990-
2009 
County Matching and 
regression 
Yes, significant 
employment effects of 
increasing dollar 
amount of SBA loans 
Higgins et al. 
(2020) 
Income growth 1980-
2009 
County Spatial Durbin 
model 
No, SBA lending is 
negatively associated 
with per capita income 
growth 
 
Notwithstanding, some studies provide evidence that SBA lending has failed to achieve 
its intended policy goals. For example, Cortes (2010) finds no significant impact on income 
growth although a positive impact was apparent on some economic performance indicators, such 
as employment. Lee (2018) also investigated whether SBA lending increased employment rates, 
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payroll, and wages between 1993 and 2002 across 316 metropolitan areas in the U.S. While Lee 
(2018) finds a positive relationship between SBA lending and economic performance using a 
standard growth regression analysis, the application of first-difference and instrumental variable 
regressions to mitigate endogeneity reveals no significant employment or income growth effects 
resulting from small business loans. More recently, Higgins et al. (2020) find that SBA lending 
was negatively associated with income growth in U.S. counties between 1980 and 2009. The 
summary of the key literature on SBA lending discussed in this section is presented in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology  
3.3.1 Data  
The data on SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504 loans obtained from the SBA included 
borrower and lender information on all SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504 loans from 2010 to 2016, 
while the data on socioeconomic conditions were derived from various sources, including the 
U.S. Decennial Census, American Community Survey, County Business Pattern, and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Detailed descriptions of all the variables are presented in Table 
3.2. Although most extant studies employed metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) or states as 
units of analysis, more disaggregated data, such as county- or firm-level data, may be more 
appropriate to reflect local market conditions in the lending process (Brown & Earle, 2017; 
Higgins et al., 2020). In this study, therefore, the data were aggregated at a county level. 
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Table 3.2 Variable description 
Variables Description Source 
Dependent Variable   
Employment rate The number of employees as a percentage of the civilian 
labor force in each county   
Decennial 
Census; ACS 
2011-2016 
Key Independent Variables   
SBA  The number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses or the 
dollar amount (in thousands) of SBA loans per business in 
each county 
SBA  
Low- and Moderate- 
Income (LMI) 
An indicator variable equal to one if median household 
income in a county is less than 80% of the national median 
household income, zero otherwise   
Decennial 
Census; ACS 
2011-2016 
Low-income (Low) An indicator variable equal to one if median household 
income in a county is less than 50% of the national median 
household income, zero otherwise 
 
Black The share of Black population in a county  
Hispanic The share of Hispanic  
SBA × LMI SBA loans × Low- and Moderate-Income  
SBA × Black SBA loans × Black  
SBA × Hispanic SBA loans × Hispanic  
SBA × LMI× Black SBA loans × Low- and Moderate-Income × Black  
SBA × LMI× Hispanic SBA loans × Low- and Moderate-Income × Hispanic  
   
Other Variables    
Population  Total population in each county (log) Decennial 
Census; ACS 
2011-2016 
Education A share of population over the age of 25 with at least four 
years of college education 
Manufacturers Location quotient for manufacturing – share of 
manufacturing employment in county employment to the 
share of overall manufacturing in US employment 
Retailers Location quotient for retailers – share of retail 
employment in county employment to the share of overall 
retailers in US employment 
Wholesalers  Location quotient for wholesalers – share of wholesale 
employment in county employment to the share of overall 
wholesaler in US employment 
Services Location quotient for personal services including hair/nail 
salon, full-service restaurant, etc. – share of service 
employment in county employment to the share of overall 
service workers in US employment 
Small Businesses The number of small businesses in each county County 
Business 
Pattern 
Firm Size The share of small businesses with 20 employees or less 
Deposit The total deposit of the commercial banks in a county 
(log) 
FDIC’s 
Summary of 
Deposit 
database 
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3.3.2 Methodology  
First-difference estimate 
The empirical tests conducted for this study estimated the effects of SBA small business 
lending on employment using seven-year county panel data from 2010 to 2016. Most previous 
studies used fixed-effect estimation, which requires a strict exogeneity assumption, to control for 
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity (Cortes, 2010; Craig et al., 2007). However, the strict 
exogeneity assumption does not hold when the dependent variable (e.g., annual employment 
rate) is observed over time, and the value of the dependent variable depends in part on its values 
in the previous period (Wooldridge, 2013). In this study, first-difference estimation is therefore 
used because it assumes considerably weaker exogeneity by allowing the future values of the 
regressors to be correlated with the error. This estimation strategy yields the following reduced-
form estimation model: 
(1) ∆ Empi, t = ∆ SBAi, t-1 𝛽1 +∆ LMIi, t-1 𝛽2 +∆ Black i, t-1 𝛽3 + ∆ Hispanic i, t-1 𝛽4 + ∆ Xi, t-1 𝛾 + 
∆ 𝜇t + ∆ 𝜀i t      
In Equation (1), Empi, t is the annual employment rate for county i at time t. The primary 
variable of interest on the right side of the equation is SBAi, t-1, which is the lagged SBA loans, 
measured as the number of loans per 1,000 businesses1. Moreover, the variable SBA loans is 
categorized into two groups—7(a) loans and 504 loans—to determine whether the effects of 
SBA loans on local employment vary based on the type of SBA program. LMIi, t-1 equals one if 
the median household income in a county is less than 80% of the national median household 
income; otherwise, it is zero. The 80% cutoff corresponds to the definition of LMI geographies 
by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD, 
 
1 This study used the total dollar value of SBA loans as an alternative measure of SBA loans to check the robustness 
of the findings later.  
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2020)2. Black i, t-1 represents the proportion of the black population in a county, and Hispanic i, t-1 
represents the proportion of the Hispanic population in a county. A series of a county’s economic 
characteristics are included in Xi, t-1 as the set of lagged control variables. Based on prior 
literature, this study included population size, the proportion of the population with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher, the number of small businesses, and the proportion of small businesses with 20 
employees or less to measure each county’s basic demographic and economic profile. The 
variables of location quotient for manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers, and services are included 
to measure how concentrated a particular industry was in a county compared to the national 
average because local industrial composition is an important determinant of local employment 
(Cortes, 2010; Ramsey, 2018). The commercial banks’ deposits in a county are used to measure 
the competitiveness of the local banking market.  
I then extend the analysis by estimating Equation (2) to determine whether SBA lending 
has a larger impact on counties with lower- and moderate-incomes (LMI). As discussed earlier, 
for small businesses, LMI black or Hispanic counties may be more vulnerable locations in terms 
of securing bank credit than upper- or middle-income white counties because they are often 
discriminated against twice: first, because of their minority status, and second, because of 
geography (i.e., redlining) (Bates, 2010; Bates et al., 2018; Bates & Robb, 2016; Immergluck, 
2002; Immergluck & Mullen, 1998). As previously noted, if an SBA lending program alleviates 
market failure such as credit rationing, adverse selection, or moral hazard (Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981), then SBA lending will have a greater impact on LMI black or Hispanic counties. This 
study therefore also assesses whether the positive effects of SBA lending programs were greater 
 
2 The 50% cutoff was also used to check for sensitivity. The results are reported in the section on robustness checks 
on page XX. 
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in LMI minority counties, particularly those where the proportion of the black or Hispanic 
population was higher:   
(2) ∆ Empi, t = ∆ SBAi, t-1 𝛽1 +∆ LMIi, t-1 𝛽2 +∆ Black i, t-1 𝛽3 + ∆ Hispanic i, t-1 𝛽4 + ∆ SBA × 
LMIi, t-1 𝛽5 + ∆ SBA × LMI × Black i, t-1 𝛽6 + ∆ SBA × LMI × Hispanic i, t-1 𝛽7 + ∆ Xi, t-1 𝛾 
+ ∆ 𝜇t + ∆ 𝜀i t       
where the variable SBA × LMIi, t-1 is an interaction term that is equal to SBA lending 
times, and the dummy variables indicate the LMI counties. A positive and significant coefficient 
of SBA × LMIi, t-1 indicates that SBA lending has a larger impact in LMI counties. The variable 
SBA × LMI × Black i, t-1 is an interaction term that is equal to SBA lending times, with dummy 
variables indicating LMI county times and the proportion of the black population in a county. 
The variable SBA × LMI × Hispanic i, t-1 indicates an interaction term that is equal to SBA 
lending times, with dummy variables indicating LMI county times and the proportion of 
Hispanic population in a county. A positive and significant coefficient of SBA× LMI × Black i, t-
1 or SBA × LMI × Hispanic i, t-1 suggests that SBA lending has a larger impact in LMI counties 
with a higher proportion of black or Hispanic populations. 
 
The instrumental variable and two-stage least squares estimates 
The variable SBA may be influenced by local characteristics that are also associated with 
employment growth, and therefore endogeneity may be a concern when estimating the effects of 
SBA on employment (Cortes, 2010; Craig et al., 2007, 2008; Y. S. Lee, 2018). To address 
potential endogeneity in this study, I use the first-difference estimator to control for time-
invariant characteristics that may have affected the outcome variables. The lagged variables are 
also used because past SBA loans may be more responsible for present employment than present 
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levels of SBA loans (Rupasingha & Wang, 2017). However, these strategies may not be 
sufficient to rule out a risk of endogeneity. For instance, the estimated effects of SBA loans on 
employment may be biased upward if prosperous counties see higher levels of entrepreneurial 
activity and more SBA loans. Conversely, if struggling counties see higher levels of SBA loans, 
then the estimated effects may be biased downward. Additionally, if the lagged SBA loans are 
correlated with the current SBA loans, a relationship between current employment and the 
lagged SBA lending activity can not be completely ruled out. Therefore, to further alleviate the 
endogeneity, this study uses a first-differenced two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification with 
years since interstate banking deregulation as the instrumental variable3 (Y. S. Lee, 2018).  
Banks in the U.S. were prohibited from establishing branches across state borders until 
the 1970s, and only decades have passed since states started to permit interstate banking, which 
allows banks to own and operate branches in more than one state (Davis & Katchova, 2020). 
This deregulation has provided more opportunities for commercial lending (Kroszner & Strahan, 
1999). The areas that deregulated banking earlier therefore have more options for commercial 
lending, and this in turn could reduce the need to go through the bureaucracy of the SBA to 
secure government-guaranteed loans (Y. S. Lee, 2018).       
 
Robustness Analysis    
The results of two alternative empirical specifications are reported to check the 
robustness of the findings. First, this study uses the dollar value of SBA loans per business as 
another measure of SBA loans and tests whether an increasing dollar value of SBA loans per 
 
3 This study also tested past SBA loans as an alternative instrumental variable. However, the results of the F-
statistics on the estimators of the instrument were mostly less than 10. This means that past SBA loans were not 
valid as the instrumental variable because the F-statistics should be larger than 10 to ensure that the maximum bias 
in the instrumental variable estimators is less than 10% (Staiger & Stock, 1997).   
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business was positively associated with employment. Second, the effects of SBA loans on 
employment may differ between LMI and low-income counties. Therefore, the results using the 
50% cutoff of median household income are also reported 
 
3.4 Results  
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the study. The 
first column indicates the full sample, and the second and third columns represent the 2010 and 
2016 samples, respectively. The last column shows the change in each variable between 2010 
and 2016. Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 illustrate the trend in annual employment and the size of the 
SBA programs for all, LMI, and low-income counties, respectively.  
The average employment rate in U.S. counties declined continuously from 56.3 percent 
in 2010 to 54.3 percent in 2014 but has shown signs of recovery since 2015. Despite a resilient 
economy in recent years, the employment rate of 54.5 percent in 2016 did not reach the 2010 
level. As Figure 3.3 shows, LMI and low-income counties followed the national trends overall. 
However, their employment rates were much lower than the national average. The average 
employment rates for LMI counties were 51.2 percent in 2010 and 48.4 percent in 2016, a 
decrease of 2.8 percentage points. It is worth noting that annual employment rates for low-
income counties were below 40% between 2010 and 2016. Low-income counties also 
experienced a 1.5 percentage point decline in their annual employment rates from 39.6 percent to 
38.1 percent over the same period.  
Table 3.3 shows that the total number of SBA loans decreased from 6.86 to 6.65 per 
1,000 businesses between 2010 and 2016, while the total loan dollar value per business increased 
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over the same period. These figures suggest that the average dollar value per loan that small 
businesses borrowed through SBA programs, particularly the 7(a) program, increased. This 
increased dollar value per loan may be attributed to economic expansion during the post-
recession era but is more likely to be the result of the new law, the Small Business Jobs Act of 
20104, which increased the SBA’s maximum loan guarantee to 90 percent for most 7(a) 
programs from $2 million to $5 million (Pub. L. 111-240). 
As shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, between 2010 and 2016, the SBA lending activity for 
LMI counties was lower than the national average. Meanwhile, compared to LMI counties, low-
income counties had substantially lower SBA loan volumes in terms of both the number of 
approved loans and their dollar value. Notably, the gap between LMI and low-income counties 
was most apparent in 2015, with 5.7 loans per 1,000 businesses for LMI counties compared to 
2.8 per 1,000 businesses for low-income counties. The loan dollar value per business for LMI 
counties increased from $1,805 in 2010 to $2,671 in 2011 but experienced a decline in the years 
that followed before rebounding in 2015. Low-income counties followed a similar pattern except 
that they experienced a further decline in loan values in 2015 (see Figure 3.3). 
Table 3.3 also shows the descriptive statistics for the other control variables. Between 
2010 and 2016, the average proportion of LMI counties in the U.S. was 44 percent, and low-
income counties accounted for 2 percent. Over the same period, the proportions of black and 
Hispanic populations increased slightly. In 2016, counties had, on average, 110 more small 
businesses than in 2010. However, the proportion of small businesses with 20 employees or less 
decreased slightly from 90 percent in 2010 to 89 percent in 2016. 
 
 
4 On September 27, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Small Business Jobs Act to help small businesses 
continue to drive economic recovery and create jobs.  
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics  
Variable 
Mean (Std. Dev) 
Change 
2010-2016 All 
Samples 
2010  
Samples 
2016 
Samples 
 Employment (%) 55.16 
(8.18) 
56.29 
(7.95) 
54.52 
(8.39) 
-1.77 
 Number of SBA per 1,000 businesses 6.38 
(10.35) 
6.86 
(9.78) 
6.65 
(9.56) 
-0.21 
 Number of SBA 7(a) per 1,000 businesses 5.73 
(10.15) 
6.05 
(9.56) 
6.19 
(9.41) 
0.14 
 Number of SBA 504 per 1,000 businesses 0.65 
(1.52) 
0.81 
(1.65) 
0.45 
(1.03) 
-0.36 
 Dollar amount of SBA loans per business  
 (in thousands) 
2.42 
(6.29) 
1.99 
(3.25) 
2.99 
(11.73) 
1.00 
 Dollar amount of SBA 7(a) loans per business  
 (in thousands) 
2.04 
(6.12) 
1.61 
(3.04) 
2.68 
(11.68) 
1.07 
 Dollar amount of SBA 504 loans per business  
 (in thousands) 
3.84 
(1.15) 
0.39 
(1.10) 
0.31 
(0.94) 
-0.08 
 Low- and moderate- income (LMI) 0.44 
(0.50) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
-0.04 
 Black (%) 8.86 
(14.46) 
8.85  
(14.60) 
8.89 
(14.45) 
0.04 
 Hispanic (%) 8.33 
(13.23) 
7.83 
(12.87) 
8.95 
(13.60) 
1.12 
 Education  0.21 
(0.09) 
0.20 
(0.09) 
0.22 
(0.10) 
0.02 
 Population (log) 10.27 
(1.46) 
10.27 
(1.45) 
10.27 
(1.48) 
0.00 
 Location quotient for manufacturing 1.13 
(0.66) 
1.15 
(0.68) 
0.92 
(0.50) 
-0.23 
 Location quotient for retailers 0.94 
(0.24) 
0.99 
(0.22) 
0.58 
(0.14) 
-0.41 
 Location quotient for wholesales 1.11 
(0.79) 
0.86 
(0.39) 
2.84 
(0.65) 
1.98 
Location quotient for service 0.82 0.87 0.48 -0.39 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.13)  
 Firm size 0.89 
(0.04) 
0.90 
(0.04) 
0.89 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
 Small businesses (in thousands) 2.38 
(8.17) 
2.35 
(7.93) 
2.46 
(8.57) 
0.11 
 Deposit  12.39 
(3.22) 
12.36 
(3.16) 
12.40 
(3.40) 
0.04 
 Observations 25,109 3,136 3,140 - 
Note: Employment is the average annual employment rate over our sample period, 2010-2016, in a county. LMI is a 
dummy variable equal to one, zero otherwise, if median household income in a county is less than 80% of the 
national median household income. Black (or Hispanic) represents the share of Black (or Hispanic) population in a 
county. Education is the share of population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. A set of location quotient variables 
indicate how concentrated a particular industry in the local market. Firm size is the share of small businesses 
with 20 employees or less. Deposit is the log of the commercial banks’ total deposit in a county.  
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Source: Author’s calculation derived from the 2010 Decennial Census and ACS 2011–2016 
Figure 3.1 Average employment rate in U.S. counties, 2010–2016 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation derived from the Small Business Administration’s database 
Figure 3.2 Average number of SBA loans for LMI and low-income counties, 2010–2016 
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Source: My calculation derived from the Small Business Administration’s database 
Figure 3.3 Dollar value of SBA loans for LMI and low-income counties, 2010–2016 
 
3.4.2 Empirical Results  
Table 3.4 presents the results of the effects of an increase in the number of SBA loans on 
employment, and Tables 3.5 and 3.6 indicate the results of the SBA 7(a) and 504 programs, 
respectively. In the tables, the first and third columns denote the OLS results, and the second and 
fourth column show the IV estimations. Because of space limitations, this study only reports the 
coefficients of the instrumental variable and the F-values for the first-stage regressions. As 
shown, the coefficients of the instrumental variable of years since interstate banking deregulation 
were negative and significant across all the models, suggesting that small businesses are less 
likely to go through the bureaucracy required to secure SBA loans if they have other commercial 
lending options. Furthermore, the F-values for the first stage pass the rule of thumb F > 10 very 
well, indicating that the IV is strong enough in terms of predictive power. All the models shared 
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control variables that measured the counties’ socioeconomic characteristics, and the year-fixed 
effects were included.  
The results of the total SBA loans (Table 3.4) were similar to those for the SBA 7(a) 
loans (Table 3.5) because the number of SBA 7(a) loans accounted for nearly 90% of the total 
SBA loans, and their dollar value constituted at least 80% of the total dollar value of the SBA 
loans over the study period. When discussing the results, this study therefore focused on SBA 
7(a) and 504 loans. The results of the robustness checks on a number of different specifications 
are also reported in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.  
 
Main results: The effects of SBA loans on employment  
The results of the IV analysis in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 clearly indicate that the estimated 
coefficients of the SBA loans were negative and statistically significant. This implies that an 
increase in SBA loans, particularly 7(a) loans, in non-LMI counties, was negatively associated 
with employment. While there may be various reasons for the association of a decrease in 
employment with an increase in SBA loans, capital–labor substitution is one possible mechanism 
behind these findings (Higgins et al., 2020). In other words, if capital and labor are substitutes, 
small businesses that can substitute capital for labor may increase their capital and lower 
employment. Notwithstanding, even if small businesses that receive SBA loans expand their 
businesses and increase employment, the aggregate employment effect at a county level may be 
attenuated or even negative if there are negative spillover effects on competing small businesses 
(Brown & Earle, 2017). It is also possible that SBA loans may crowd out commercial lending. If 
so, there would be little capital addition in the area. In that case, even if SBA loans have positive 
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effects on employment, these effects may be attenuated or turn out to be negative at a county 
aggregate level.  
This study finds some evidence that employment growth was negatively associated with 
LMI, black, and Hispanic counties, which is not surprising because lower employment has been 
an issue in these communities for a long time. For example, column 4 in Table 3.5 shows that the 
employment rate for LMI counties was 0.4 percentage points lower than that for non-LMI 
counties. However, the positive and significant coefficient of SBA7a × LMI indicates that SBA 
7(a) loans had a positive effect on employment in LMI counties, with one increase in SBA 7(a) 
loans per 1,000 businesses increasing the employment rate by 0.09 percentage points. The 
difference in employment rates between LMI and non-LMI counties was therefore narrowed 
down to 0.31 percentage points. The results also reveal that LMI counties where the proportion 
of the black population was higher had an additional employment gain of 0.02 percentage points. 
These findings are consistent with the credit-rationing argument that less developed financial 
markets, such as minority-concentrated neighborhoods, receive relatively higher benefits as a 
result of governmental interventions in small business credit markets (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Nevertheless, the results of the effects of SBA 504 loans on employment were somewhat 
different from those of SBA 7(a) loans. While the employment effects of SBA 7(a) loans (shown 
in Table 3.5) were negative in non-LMI counties, columns 2 and 4 in Table 3.6 demonstrate that 
the employment rate increased by 0.25–0.26 percentage points with one increase in the number 
of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 businesses in these counties. Furthermore, column 4 in Table 3.6 
shows that the employment rate in LMI counties was 0.18 percentage points lower than that in 
non-LMI counties, but SBA loans reduced the gap by increasing the employment rate by 0.24 
percentage points for every 504 loan per 1,000 businesses in LMI counties. The positive 
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employment effects of the SBA 504 loan program may be due to its emphasis on community 
development through employment. Indeed, the 504 program requires small businesses that use 
504 funds to create or retain at least one job for every $65,000 guaranteed by the SBA. However, 
the results indicate that the SBA 504 loans did not have an additional employment effect in LMI 
black or Hispanic counties.  
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Table 3.4 Changes in U.S. counties’ employment rate associated with the number of SBA loans 
per 1,000 businesses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV 
Number of total SBA loans per 1,000 businesses (SBA) -0.00** -0.15*** -0.00 -0.16*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) 
Black (%) -0.04 -0.06* -0.04 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Hispanic (%) -0.08*** -0.01 -0.08*** 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) 
Low moderate income (LMI) 0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.78*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) 
SBA × LMI   -0.00 0.15*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
SBA × LMI × Black   0.01 0.02** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
SBA × LMI × Hispanic   -0.01 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.02) 
Education -1.22 -0.11 -1.23 0.70 
 (1.45) (2.45) (1.45) (2.47) 
Population (log) -3.64** 1.46 -3.60** 0.46 
 (1.36) (2.26) (1.35) (1.65) 
Manufacturing 0.26** 0.16 0.26** 0.29 
 (0.12) (0.36) (0.12) (0.38) 
Retailers -0.06 0.26 -0.06 0.24 
 (0.19) (0.32) (0.19) (0.30) 
Wholesales -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.12 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) 
Services 0.11 -0.13 0.11 -0.11 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.13) 
Number of small businesses (in thousands) 0.43*** 0.32*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) 
Firm size  -3.95 0.41 -3.92 -1.40 
 (2.72) (2.71) (2.71) (2.69) 
Bank deposit (log) 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Year-fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,821 18,821 18,821 18,821 
R-squared 0.39 ‒ 0.39 ‒ 
Instrumental variable – log years of interstate banking 
deregulation 
    
First-stage coefficient  -3.42*** 
(0.27) 
 -3.22*** 
(0.25) 
First-stage F statistic  164.30  161.78 
Note: The table reports first-difference estimates in columns (1) and (3), and first-differenced 2SLS estimates in columns 
(2) and (4). Dependent variable is the number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses. Black (or Hispanic) represents the share 
of Black (or Hispanic) population in a county. LMI is a dummy variable equal to one, zero otherwise, if median household 
income in a county is less than 80% of the national median household income, and the variables of interests are a set of 
interaction variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 3.5 Changes in U.S. counties’ employment rate associated with the number of SBA 7(a) 
loans per 1,000 businesses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV 
Number of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses (SBA7a) -0.00** -0.10*** -0.00 -0.10*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Black (%) -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Hispanic (%) -0.08*** -0.03 -0.08*** 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Low moderate income (LMI) 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.40*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
SBA7a × LMI   -0.00 0.09*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
SBA7a × LMI × Black   0.01 0.02** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
SBA7a × LMI × Hispanic   -0.00 0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Education -1.21 0.24 -1.22 0.57 
 (1.45) (1.96) (1.45) (1.95) 
Population (log) -3.64*** 0.69 -3.61** 0.08 
 (1.36) (1.55) (1.36) (1.21) 
Manufacturing 0.26** 0.16 0.26** 0.25 
 (0.12) (0.26) (0.12) (0.26) 
Retailers -0.06 0.16 -0.06 0.15 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) 
Wholesales -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Services 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Number of small businesses (in thousands) 0.43*** 0.32*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) 
Firm size  -3.95 -0.65 -3.92 -1.68 
 (2.71) (2.29) (2.70) (2.30) 
Bank deposit (log) 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year-fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,821 18,821 18,821 18,821 
R-squared 0.39 ‒ 0.39 ‒ 
     
Instrumental variable – log years of interstate banking 
deregulation 
    
First-stage coefficient  -5.45*** 
(0.27) 
 -5.29*** 
(0.25) 
First-stage F statistic  359.75  440.79 
Note: The table reports first-difference estimates in columns (1) and (3), and first-differenced 2SLS estimates in 
columns (2) and (4). Dependent variable is the number of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses. Black (or Hispanic) 
represents the share of Black (or Hispanic) population in a county. LMI is a dummy variable equal to one, zero 
otherwise, if median household income in a county is less than 80% of the national median household income, and 
the variables of interests are a set of interaction variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are 
shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 Changes in U.S. counties’ employment rate associated with the number of SBA 504 
loans per 1,000 businesses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV 
Number of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 businesses (SBA504) 0.00 0.26*** -0.01 0.25*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black (%) -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Hispanic (%) -0.08*** -0.04 -0.08*** -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Low moderate income (LMI) -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.18*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
SBA504 × LMI   0.01 0.24*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
SBA504 × LMI × Black   0.08 0.08 
   (0.06) (0.06) 
SBA504 × LMI × Hispanic   -0.04 -0.05 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Education -1.21 0.83 -1.20 0.39 
 (1.44) (1.54) (1.45) (1.61) 
Population (log) -3.69*** -0.62 -3.69*** -0.61 
 (1.36) (1.00) (1.37) (0.99) 
Manufacturing 0.26** 0.17 0.26** 0.19 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Retailers -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Wholesales -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Services 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.15 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) 
Number of small businesses (in thousands) 0.43*** 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.34*** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) 
Firm size  -4.03 -2.43 -4.03 -2.21 
 (2.71) (2.15) (2.75) (2.24) 
Bank deposit (log) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year-fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,821 18,821 18,821 18,821 
R-squared 0.39 ‒ 0.39 ‒ 
     
Instrumental variable – log years of interstate banking 
deregulation 
    
First-stage coefficient  -2.03*** 
(0.03) 
 -2.06*** 
(0.03) 
First-stage F statistic  460.44  517.89 
Note: The table reports first-difference estimates in columns (1) and (3), and first-differenced 2SLS estimates in 
columns (2) and (4). Dependent variable is the number of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 businesses. Black (or Hispanic) 
represents the share of Black (or Hispanic) population in a county. LMI is a dummy variable equal to one, zero 
otherwise, if median household income in a county is less than 80% of the national median household income, and 
the variables of interests are a set of interaction variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are 
shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Alternative empirical specification and Small Business Administration lending measures 
This section delineates robustness checks undertaken in this study. First, using the dollar 
value of SBA loans as another measure of SBA loans, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the results of 
whether an increasing dollar value of SBA loans per business is positively associated with 
employment. As shown in the tables, this study finds consistent evidence of the effects of SBA 
loans measured either as the number of loans or the loan dollar value. All the control variables 
and year-fixed effects were included but not reported. Overall, this study finds consistent 
evidence across all the different model specifications.  
Table 3.7 shows that employment rates decreased as the dollar value of SBA 7(a) loans 
per business increased in non-LMI counties. The results also reveal that while the employment 
rates for LMI counties were 0.41 percentage points lower than those for non-LMI counties, a 
$1,000 increase in per business SBA 7(a) loans increased employment rates by 0.27 percentage 
points. The gap between LMI and non-LMI counties was therefore reduced to 0.14 percentage 
points. This study further finds that LMI black counties had additional employment effects as the 
dollar value of SBA 7(a) loans increased. However, the coefficient of SBA7a × LMI × Hispanic 
is negative and significant, which indicates a decrease in the employment effects for LMI 
counties with a higher proportion of Hispanics.  
Similar to the results of the number of SBA 504 loans measure, Table 3.8 shows that 
SBA 504 loan value had a positive effect on employment in both LMI and non-LMI counties. 
Specifically, a $1,000 increase per business SBA 504 loan increased employment rates by 0.34 
percentage points in non-LMI counties and 0.36 percentage points in LMI counties. However, 
the findings also revealed that an increase in SBA 504 loans had no additional effect on 
employment in LMI counties with a higher proportion of black or Hispanic populations.  
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Table 3.7 Changes in U.S. counties’ employment rate associated with the dollar value of SBA 
7(a) loans     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV 
Dollar amount (in thousands) of SBA7a loans per 
businesses (SBA7a) 
-0.00 -0.26*** 0.01 -0.28*** 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Black (%) -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Hispanic (%) -0.08*** -0.07* -0.08*** -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Low moderate income (LMI) 0.04 0.01 0.08 -0.41*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
SBA7a × LMI   -0.02* 0.27*** 
   (0.01) (0.02) 
SBA7a × LMI × Black   0.01*** 0.01*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
SBA7a × LMI × Hispanic   -0.01*** -0.01*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year-fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,821 18,821 18,821 18,821 
R-squared 0.38 ‒ 0.39 ‒ 
     
Instrumental variable – log years of interstate banking 
deregulation 
    
First-stage coefficient  -2.03*** 
(0.17) 
 -1.86*** 
(0.12) 
First-stage F statistic  135.43  256.44 
Note: The table reports first-difference estimates in columns (1) and (3), and first-differenced 2SLS estimates in 
columns (2) and (4). Dependent variable is the dollar value of the SBA 7(a) loans per business. Black (or Hispanic) 
represents the share of Black (or Hispanic) population in a county. Low is a dummy variable equal to one, zero 
otherwise, if median household income in a county is less than 50% of the national median household income, and 
the variables of interests are a set of interaction variables. Control variables include education, population, location 
quotients for manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers, firm size, number of small businesses and commercial banks’ 
deposit. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8 Changes in U.S. counties’ employment rate associated with the dollar value of SBA 
504 loans     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV 
Dollar amount (in thousands) of SBA504 loans per 
businesses (SBA504) 
-0.00 0.35*** 0.00 0.34*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black (%) -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Hispanic (%) -0.08*** -0.05 -0.08*** -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Low moderate income (LMI) -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
SBA504 × LMI   -0.02 0.36*** 
   (0.02) (0.03) 
SBA504 × LMI × Black   0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
SBA504 × LMI × Hispanic   0.00 0.00 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year-fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,821 18,821 18,821 18,821 
R-squared 0.38 ‒ 0.39 ‒ 
     
Instrumental variable – log years of interstate banking 
deregulation 
    
First-stage coefficient  -1.51*** 
(0.03) 
 -1.53*** 
(0.02) 
First-stage F statistic  339.52  531.13 
Note: The table reports first-difference estimates in columns (1) and (3), and first-differenced 2SLS estimates in 
columns (2) and (4). Dependent variable is the dollar amount of SBA 504 loans per business. Black (or Hispanic) 
represents the share of Black (or Hispanic) population in a county. Low is a dummy variable equal to one, zero 
otherwise, if median household income in a county is less than 50% of the national median household income, and 
the variables of interests are a set of interaction variables. Control variables include education, population, location 
quotients for manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers, firm size, number of small businesses and commercial banks’ 
deposit. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Second, the economic conditions in LMI counties may differ from those in low-income 
counties. In accordance with the HUD definition, this study defined low-income communities as 
those with 50% or less of the median household income for the area. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show 
the results of the employment effects of SBA loans measured as the number of SBA loans per 
1,000 businesses and the dollar value of loans per business in low-income counties, respectively. 
In both tables, the first two columns represent SBA 7(a) loans, and the third and fourth columns 
indicate SBA 504 loans.   
Based on the IV estimates in column 2, Table 3.9 shows that increasing the number of 
SBA 7(a) loans had a negative effect in non-low-income counties but a positive effect in low-
income counties. As indicated in Table 3.5, this study finds that the employment effect of SBA 
7(a) loans was positive for black LMI counties. However, column 2 in Table 3.9 confirms that 
SBA 7(a) loans did not have an effect on black low-income counties. In terms of the effects of 
SBA 504, contrary to the findings in Table 3.6, column 4 in Table 3.9 shows that an increasing 
number of SBA 504 loans in black or Hispanic low-income counties had a positive effect on 
employment. 
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Table 3.9 Changes in U.S. counties’ employment rate associated with the number of SBA loans     
 SBA 7(a) SBA 504 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV 
Number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses (SBA) -0.01** -0.09*** 0.00 0.26*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Black (%) -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Hispanic (%) -0.08*** -0.02 -0.08*** -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Low income (Low) -0.03 -0.43 -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.29) (0.27) (0.32) (0.31) 
SBA*Low -0.00 0.09*** 0.13** -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) 
SBA*Low*Black 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SBA*Low*Hispanic -0.00 -0.00 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year-fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,821 18,821 18,821 18,821 
R-squared 0.09 ‒ 0.09 ‒ 
     
Instrumental variable – log years of interstate banking 
deregulation 
    
First-stage coefficient  -5.54*** 
(0.28) 
 -2.03*** 
(0.03) 
First-stage F statistic  379.83  467.25 
Note: The table reports first-difference estimates in columns (1) and (3), and first-differenced 2SLS estimates in 
columns (2) and (4). Dependent variable is the number of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses in columns (1) and 
(2), and the number of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 businesses in columns (3) and (4). Black (or Hispanic) represents 
the share of Black (or Hispanic) population in a county. Low is a dummy variable equal to one, zero otherwise, if 
median household income in a county is less than 50% of the national median household income, and the variables 
of interests are a set of interaction variables. Control variables include education, population, location quotients for 
manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers, firm size, number of small businesses and commercial banks’ deposit. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Table 3.10 illustrates the effects of the increasing dollar value of SBA loans per business 
on employment. Similar to the findings in Table 3.9, the employment effects of SBA 7(a) loans 
were positive for low-income counties, particularly where the proportion of the black population 
was higher, as indicated in column 2. The results also suggest that employment increased with 
every $1,000 increase in SBA 504 loans per business in low-income counties where the 
proportion of the Hispanic population was higher, which is consistent with the findings in 
Table 3.9.  
Table 3.10 Changes in U.S. counties’ employment rate associated with the dollar value of SBA 
loans     
 SBA 7(a) SBA 504 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV 
Dollar amount (in thousands) of SBA loans per 
business 
-0.00 -0.26*** -0.00 0.35*** 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Black (%) -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Hispanic (%) -0.08*** -0.06* -0.08*** -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Low income (Low) 0.02 -0.53** -0.06 0.04 
 (0.30) (0.23) (0.32) (0.33) 
SBA*Low -0.01* 0.25*** 0.06*** 0.24*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
SBA*Low*Black 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SBA*Low*Hispanic -0.01** -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year-fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 18,821 18,821 18,821 18,821 
R-squared 0.09 ‒ 0.09 ‒ 
     
Instrumental variable – log years of interstate banking 
deregulation 
    
First-stage coefficient  -2.03*** 
(0.17) 
 -1.51*** 
(0.03) 
First-stage F statistic  141.02  343.21 
Note: The table reports first-difference estimates in columns (1) and (3), and first-differenced 2SLS estimates in 
columns (2) and (4). Dependent variable is the dollar value of the SBA 7(a) loans per business in columns (1) and 
(2), and the dollar value of the SBA 504 loans per business in columns (3) and (4). Black (or Hispanic) represents 
the share of Black (or Hispanic) population in a county. Low is a dummy variable equal to one, zero otherwise, if 
median household income in a county is less than 50% of the national median household income, and the variables 
of interests are a set of interaction variables. Control variables include education, population, location quotients for 
manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers, firm size, number of small businesses and commercial banks’ deposit. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.5 Discussion  
There is a general consensus that gaps exist with respect to access to financial capital for 
small businesses in different communities. In particular, small businesses in lower-income 
communities and/or those with a higher proportion of minorities are more likely to face credit 
rationing in the financial market, which justifies the existence of government-guaranteed lending 
programs such as SBA loans. Accordingly, using data from the SBA’s small business lending 
programs and the seven-year county panels from 2010 to 2016, this study tests whether SBA 
lending had a larger impact on counties with lower incomes and/or where the proportion of the 
black or Hispanic population was higher.  
Overall, this study finds that an increase in SBA loans had a positive effect on 
employment in underserved communities, which suggests that capital and labor are gross 
complements rather than substitutes. However, when examining the effects of SBA lending by 
program and counties’ race and income demographics, there is some heterogeneity across 
counties. Specifically, the effects of an increase in SBA 7(a) loans are negative for non-LMI 
counties but positive for LMI counties, particularly where the proportion of the black population 
is higher. There is no effect on LMI counties where the proportion of the Hispanic population 
was higher. However, unlike with SBA 7(a) loans, an increase in SBA 504 loans has a positive 
effect on employment in both LMI and non-LMI counties although the findings show no 
additional employment gains from SBA loans in LMI counties where the proportion of the black 
or Hispanic population was higher.  
This study also investigates whether counties with a greater volume of SBA 504 loans, 
which place emphasis on employment growth and job retention, experience better economic 
outcomes. The analysis indicates that there were larger employment effects as a result of SBA 
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504 loans than SBA 7(a) loans. For example, in LMI counties, the employment rate increased by 
0.24 percentage points for every 504 loan per 1,000 businesses and by 0.09 percentage points for 
every 7(a) loan per 1,000 businesses. Moreover, a $1,000 increase in SBA 504 loan value per 
business increased employment rates by 0.36 percentage points, while the same value increase in 
SBA 7(a) loans increased the employment rate by 0.27 percentage points in LMI counties. Given 
that SBA 504 loans are used to finance commercial real estate and large equipment, and SBA 
7(a) loans are intended to finance working capital, from a policy perspective, the findings 
indicate that loans for larger items such as machinery and plants are more likely to influence 
employment. Furthermore, the evidence regarding the effects of SBA loans is mostly consistent 
across the different model specifications for the various robustness checks.  
This study contributes to the literature by (1) adding more community characteristic 
dimensions such as race, (2) providing a richer assessment of SBA lending by separately 
estimating the effects of SBA loans by program, and (3) updating the previous results in the 
literature that focused on the 1990s and 2000s. However, the results presented herein should be 
interpreted with some caution due to several limitations. First, this study reveals that the 
responses of communities to capital inflow were heterogeneous but did not test the mechanism 
underlying these findings. For example, why does the SBA 7(a) program have a positive effect 
on LMI counties but not non-LMI counties? Why does the SBA 504 program have a positive 
effect on employment for both LMI and non-LMI counties? Moreover, why do LMI black 
counties see positive impacts but LMI Hispanic counties do not? The answers to these questions 
remain unknown or are inconclusive although they are important for policymakers to better 
design guaranteed loan policies. Future research should therefore aim to provide more insights 
into this issue by examining the mechanisms underlying the different community responses to 
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SBA loans. Second, the empirical strategy of this study assumes that the effects of increasing 
SBA lending would be linear. However, communities may not respond to capital inflows until 
they reach a certain level. It is also possible that there may be diminishing returns on the amount 
of capital flowing into counties (Patrick, 2016), suggesting that the effects may be nonlinear. 
From a policy perspective, therefore, understanding this mechanism may help determine the 
most efficient allocation of scarce government resources. Third, this study did not investigate the 
effects of SBA loans by industry. This was primarily due to data constraints and the difficulty 
with constructing a balanced region–industry-level SBA loan panel. However, the impact of 
SBA loans on employment could differ by industry. It would therefore be valuable to identify 
which industries derive greater benefit from SBA loans and thus contribute to local economic 
growth. Lastly, the study results present county-level findings. However, if the impact of SBA 
loans is examined at an individual firm level, the results may change (Y. S. Lee, 2018). I hope 
this study offers a clearer understanding of the effects of SBA programs on different 
communities and assists policy makers in tailoring SBA programs based on communities’ 
characteristics. 
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4 INTRAMETROPOLITAN PATTERNS OF SMALL BUSINESS LENDING UNDER 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY 
DESIGN ANALYSIS  
Abstract  
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is a 1977 federal law that encourages 
depository institutions to meet the credit needs of low- to moderate-income (LMI) 
neighborhoods whose median family income is less than 80% of the area’s median family 
income. By taking advantage of this 80% or less income threshold, this study uses regression 
discontinuity design to examine how the CRA influences the Small Business Administration 
(SBA)’s lending activity in LMI neighborhoods, with a special focus on geographic distribution. 
Using seven metropolitan areas that represent America’s urban areas in numerous ways, this 
study compares SBA lending activity between neighborhoods that are just below and just above 
the income threshold for CRA designation and finds little evidence that the CRA increases SBA 
lending in LMI neighborhoods. However, when exploring the effects of CRA coverage by 
metropolitan ring, the findings indicate the positive effects of the CRA for inner-ring suburbs but 
little effect for central city and outer-ring suburbs, while there were some variations across 
different metropolitan areas. Further distinguishing the effects by SBA program—SBA 504 vs. 
7(a)—shows that the CRA has a positive effect on SBA 504 lending but not on 7(a) lending. 
Taken together, the overall results suggest that the CRA has insignificant or (at best) a modest 
impact on SBA lending in LMI neighborhoods.  
 
Keywords: Community Reinvestment Act, low income, moderate income, central city, inner-ring 
suburbs, outer-ring suburbs    
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4.1 Introduction  
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was established in 1977 to address the credit 
needs of borrowers in low- and moderate-income (LMI) areas, including traditionally excluded 
minority communities. The legislation, although well intended, has been a source of contention 
since its enactment (Bates & Robb, 2015). Supporters of the Act note that the CRA has made 
wealth building more accessible for minority and LMI borrowers by increasing their access to 
credit and that it supports neighborhood revitalization in its intended communities (Avery & 
Brevoort, 2015; Ding et al., 2018). However, critics of the CRA argue that competition in credit 
markets, technological changes, and market restructuring have driven out discriminatory 
practices, and therefore the increased access to credit for minority and LMI borrowers cannot be 
solely attributed to the CRA (Getter, 2020).   
A substantial volume of literature has sought to evaluate whether the CRA has adequately 
addressed the need for credit—mostly mortgage lending versus business lending—in LMI and 
minority communities. Notwithstanding, a limited number of studies focus on the effects of the 
CRA on small business lending, and this research has developed along three lines of study. The 
first group of studies, which examine whether the CRA has alleviated racial disparities in loan 
outcomes (Bates et al., 2018; Canner, 1999; Immergluck, 2002; Mijid & Bernasek, 2013), finds 
that, even though the CRA has positive impacts on the availability of loans, neighborhoods with 
a higher proportion of minorities receive, on average, fewer small business loans than white 
neighborhoods. The second line of study focuses on examining the geographic distribution of 
loans, particularly within metropolitan areas (Canner, 1999; Immergluck, 2002; Smith, 2003). 
These studies generally find substantial variations in small business lending with higher lending 
rates in central cities than in suburbs, in middle- and higher-income neighborhoods than in 
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lower-income areas, and in white neighborhoods versus minority neighborhoods. The third line 
of study investigates the broader impacts of the CRA on loan outcomes, such as the dollar value 
or number of small business loans in the market as a whole (Bostic & Lee, 2017; Ding et al., 
2018; Zinman, 2002). Using more rigorous methodologies such as a regression discontinuity 
(RD) design or difference-in-difference analysis, these studies suggest that the effects of the 
CRA can vary slightly according to the conditions each community faces, with a generally 
positive effect on small business lending.    
The current literature on this topic provides a number of insights into the overall effects 
of the CRA on small business loans in the market, but we still know little about how the CRA 
influences government-guaranteed small business lending even though there are reasons to 
believe it does. The 7(a) and 504 loan programs of the Small Business Administration (SBA) are 
the largest government-guaranteed small business lending programs and can be used to generate 
working capital, refinance debt, or buy a business, real estate, or equipment. Bank loans with 
SBA guarantees have the potential to receive CRA consideration either as loans to small 
businesses or as community development loans, and banks are incentivized to use SBA lending 
because the CRA statute requires federal banking regulators to consider a bank’s CRA record 
when it applies for permission to expand. Furthermore, for banking institutions, SBA lending 
may be more attractive than other private loan products when making loans to small businesses 
with a higher risk of default because they can mitigate the risk at least for the guaranteed portion 
of the loan.   
A few studies examine the geographic distribution of small business lending under the 
CRA, but they are relatively dated (Canner, 1999; Immergluck, 2002; Smith, 2003). Many 
neighborhoods in the U.S. have recently undergone large-scale urban redevelopment projects, 
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which have resulted in substantial economic and social changes (Meltzer, 2016). The 
demographic landscape has also changed as middle- and high-income households have returned 
to cities, and low-income groups have moved to suburban neighborhoods (Ehrenhalt, 2012; Frey, 
2003; Hanlon, 2009; Singer, 2005). Given this context, it may be reasonable to expect that recent 
patterns in small business lending may differ from those observed more than a decade ago.    
This study therefore investigates the effects of the CRA on SBA lending with a focus on 
geographic distribution. Using seven metropolitan areas that represent America’s urban areas in 
numerous ways, this study specifically seeks to answer the following questions:  
1) Do CRA-eligible neighborhoods have a higher number of SBA loans than CRA-ineligible 
neighborhoods?  
2) How does SBA lending activity differ within and across metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs)?  
From a methodological viewpoint, this study is most closely related to that of Bostic and 
Lee (2017), which examined the broader impact of the CRA on small business lending in the 
market by applying an RD design. Although this study uses a similar methodology, it differs in 
two important ways. First, this study only focuses on SBA-guaranteed loans rather than all loan 
products covered by the CRA. Since SBA-guaranteed loans differ from other private loans in 
many respects and only account for a small portion of the loans covered by the CRA, there is no 
reason to expect that the patterns observed in Bostic and Lee's (2017) research will hold in this 
study. Second, this study examines SBA lending activities within metropolitan areas instead of 
exploring the national pattern. While using a national sample has the advantage of providing an 
understanding of the broader picture of small business lending across the country, it does not 
help identify the trends at a neighborhood level. When there are substantial variations in 
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economic development levels within a metropolitan area, examining the intrametropolitan 
patterns of small business lending can offer potential implications for planners and policymakers.  
The balance of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 explores how the CRA works 
with a focus on its mission, regulatory framework, and eligibility criteria, and further briefly 
reviews the literature on the effects of the CRA on small business lending. A discussion 
regarding how the CRA can influence SBA lending activity follows. Section 4.3 describes the 
study area, and Section 4.4 discusses data, and methodology used in this study. Section 4.5 then 
examines the study findings on whether the effects of the CRA on SBA-guaranteed small 
business lending vary across and within the selected sample metropolitan areas. A summary of 
the major findings, potential policy implications, and limitations of this study are delineated in 
Section 4.6.    
 
4.2 Background and Literature  
4.2.1 Community Reinvestment Act  
This section briefly explores how the CRA works using information derived mostly from 
Bostic and Canner (1998). Historically, many commercials banks and thrifts were thought to 
accept deposits from households and firms in inner cities while primarily lending and investing 
them elsewhere. These disinvestment activities were thought to have contributed to the decline of 
many urban areas, and several scholars suggested alleviating financial capital barriers as a 
strategy for community revitalization (Bates, 2010; Porter, 1995). In 1977, the CRA was signed 
into law in response to concerns about the redlining of low-income areas and market failures in 
low-income communities. The legislation encourages federally insured banking institutions to 
help meet the credit needs of borrowers in all segments of the communities within their service 
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areas, particularly historically underserved lower-income communities. Although not explicitly 
covered by the CRA, minority communities have been the subject of considerable concern with 
regard to these issues because race/ethnicity intertwines with income in many cases.   
For the purpose of enforcement, all depository institutions except for credit unions, 
including banks and savings and loans, are regulated by three5 (formerly four) federal agencies 
(i.e., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve System, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation) are periodically evaluated and receive CRA compliance ratings. 
However, finance companies and other nondepository small business lenders (including newer 
fintech lenders that are not regulated depositories) are not covered by CRA. The CRA requires 
federal banking regulators to consider a bank’s CRA compliance rating when determining 
whether to approve the institution’s application for the opening or closing of a bank branch and 
mergers with, or acquisitions of, other banks. This regulatory framework has provided incentives 
for banking institutions to expand their services to LMI and minority neighborhoods (Getter, 
2020).  
The CRA has traditionally focused on mortgage lending, but the regulatory reforms of 
1995 expanded its coverage to small business lending because lending to small businesses was 
also thought to be critical for vital and viable communities. The CRA defines small business 
lending as loans of less than $1,000,000 granted for business purposes and/or loans made to 
businesses with less than $1,000,000 in revenue (Zinman, 2002), and LMI areas are defined at a 
census tract level. Accordingly, the CRA counts a loan as an LMI loan if it is to a business 
 
5 After the foreclosure crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision was folded into the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency via the Dodd Frank Act of 2010. It ceased operating in 2011. 
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located in a census tract where the median family income is less than 80 percent of the median 
family income in the surrounding MSA. 
 
4.2.2 The Impacts of the CRA on Small Business Lending  
There is considerably less literature on the CRA’s impact on small business lending than 
on the legislation’s impact on mortgage lending (Ding et al., 2018). Table 4.1 summarizes the 
key literature on small business lending discussed in this section. Existing studies on small 
business lending have, for the most part, developed into three lines of study. The first line of 
research examines whether the CRA has alleviated the need for credit in minority 
neighborhoods. Although the CRA does not explicitly target small businesses in minority 
neighborhoods, many studies argue that the disparate treatment of minorities in the financial 
market is intertwined with income (Bates et al., 2018; Canner, 1999; Immergluck, 2002; Mijid & 
Bernasek, 2013). The CRA has improved credit access in minority neighborhoods (Bates & 
Robb, 2015, 2016). 
The second line of research investigates the geographic distribution of small business 
loans (Canner, 1999; Immergluck, 2002; Smith, 2003). In 1997, banks and thrifts reported 
approximately the same number of loans per small business in both central cities and suburbs 
(Canner, 1999). However, when the tracts were subdivided by income category, the low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods in both cities and suburbs fared poorly. In central cities, the 
small business lending rate was 42 percent higher for upper-income neighborhoods than for low-
income neighborhoods. Similarly, in the suburbs, upper-income neighborhoods had a 45 percent 
higher rate than lower-income neighborhoods. Canner (1999) also found that minority tracts 
received fewer loans than white tracts. Smith (2003) analyzed the distribution of Chicago area 
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small business finance using the 2001 CRA small business lending data. The findings showed 
significant variations in lending within the Chicago area. Overall, most business and small 
business loans were concentrated in the denser, older parts of the six-county area, while the 
highest levels of per business lending occurred in the rapidly growing suburban fringe. However, 
the loan availability and the sizes of the loans were far lower in the LMI and minority 
neighborhoods, particularly in the black tracts, than in the middle- and upper-income and 
predominately white areas. Immergluck (2002) found similar small business lending patterns in 
the Philadelphia area. The average number of loans per 100 businesses for predominately white 
census tracts was more than almost two times higher than for predominately Hispanic census 
tracts and 10 times higher than for black census tracts. This pattern was also confirmed in 
Immergluck’s (2002) regression analysis after controlling for firm density, firm size, industrial 
mix, neighborhood income, and the credit quality of local firms.  
The third line of research documents the causal effects of the CRA on small business 
lending outcomes for the market as a whole. Zinman (2002) employed a difference-in-difference 
analysis using the CRA reforms that took effect in 1996 as a policy shock. His findings indicated 
that banks facing binding CRA incentives increased their small business lending by 
approximately 12 to 15 percent, and the number of firms holding debt increased by around 15 
percent in counties with affected banks. Additionally, he finds that this increased access to credit 
brought benefits to the affected counties with an increase in payroll and a significant decrease in 
bankruptcy. More recent attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the CRA on small business 
lending are found in Bostic and Lee (2017) and Ding et al., (2018). While many studies have 
used an RD design to examine the effects of the CRA on mortgage lending (Avery, Calem, & 
Canner, 2003; Berry & Lee, 2007; Fitzgerald & Vitello, 2014; Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2008), 
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Bostic and Lee (2017)’s study is the first to apply this method to estimate the effects of the CRA 
on small business lending. Using the CRA data from 1996 to 2015, Bostic and Lee (2017) find 
that the CRA tends to increase small business loans in targeted areas. This was particularly 
notable during the times of economic growth from 1996 to 2002 and 2012 to 2015. However, the 
CRA also decreased small business lending during the economic downturn from 2003 to 2011. 
In addition to confirming that banking institutions responded strategically to the CRA, Bostic 
and Lee (2017)’s study indicates that macroeconomic condition can swamp the specific social 
incentives the CRA provides. Ding et al. (2018) also examined the effects of the CRA on small 
business lending. Significantly, taking advantage of the 2013 changes in the definition of MSAs 
that altered CRA eligibility for nearly 1,000 tracts across the county, the authors employ a 
difference-in-difference design to further investigate whether the effects differed between newly 
ineligible neighborhoods and newly eligible neighborhoods. Their findings suggest that the CRA 
generally increased credit to small business in lower-income areas, but the effects were greater in 
those tracts that had lost CRA eligibility than those that had newly become CRA-eligible.  
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Table 4.1 Summary of the key literature on the effects of the CRA on small business lending  
Author (year) Research Question Data Method Results 
Zinman (2002) Does the CRA increase 
credit to small 
businesses? 
CRA data 
(1993-1998) 
County-level 
Difference-in-
difference 
analysis  
CRA increases credit to small 
businesses  
Bostic & Lee 
(2017) 
Does the CRA increase 
credit to small 
businesses? 
CRA data 
(1996-2015) 
Regression 
discontinuity 
design 
CRA has positive effects, but 
macroeconomic market conditions 
swamp any incentives the CRA 
provides  
Ding et al., 
(2018) 
Does the CRA increase 
credit to small 
businesses? 
CRA data Difference-in-
difference 
analysis 
CRA increases the number of 
loans. Losing CRA eligibility 
status has a relatively larger effect 
on small business lending, while 
the effects of gaining CRA 
eligibility are less pronounced  
Bates & Robb 
(2016) 
Examines the impacts 
of owner race and 
geographic context on 
access to small business 
financing  
Kauffman Firm 
Survey (2004-
2011) 
Logistic 
regression 
analysis 
Firm location in a minority or 
inner-city neighborhood has no 
impact on loan availability or size. 
But, owner race/ethnicity is 
important.  
Bates & Robb 
(2015) 
Compares access to 
bank loans in minority 
neighborhoods to those 
in non-minority 
neighborhoods 
Kauffman Firm 
Survey (2004-
2011)  
Logistic 
regression 
analysis  
CRA has positive effects on loan 
availability, but racial disparity in 
loan outcome still exists. 
Canner (1999) Examines the 
distribution of small 
business lending by the 
degree of urbanization, 
income, and minority 
composition 
CRA data  
(1996-1997) 
OLS 
regression  
Low- and moderate- income 
neighborhoods in both cities and 
suburbs fare poorly 
Immergluck 
(2002) 
Examines the 
geographic distribution 
of small business 
lending in the 
Philadelphia MSA 
CRA data 
(1998) 
Spatial lag 
model – IV 
estimation  
African American tracts receive 
fewer loans than White tracts  
Smith (2003) Examines that the 
distribution of small 
business lending in 
Chicago area 
CRA data 
(2001) 
Explanatory 
study  
Loan availability and the size of 
loans were far lower in LMI and 
minority neighborhoods, 
particularly African American 
tracts, than middle- and upper-
income and predominately whites 
areas 
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4.2.3 The CRA and SBA-guaranteed lending  
The literature discussed above provides some insights into the overall impact of the CRA 
on small business lending in the market (Bates & Robb, 2015; Bostic & Lee, 2017; Ding et al., 
2018; Zinman, 2002). To the best of my knowledge, however, no study has been done on the 
effects of the CRA on government-guaranteed lending to date—although there are reasons to 
believe that the CRA may increase the reliance of banks’ government-guaranteed lending 
because bank loans with SBA guarantees offer some benefits.   
First, bank loans with SBA guarantees have the potential to receive CRA consideration as 
either loans to small businesses or community development loans. For example, under the large 
bank test, institutions receive CRA consideration for business loans less than $1,000,000 (Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC], 2014). Loans exceeding $1,000,000 may also qualify 
as community development loans if the purpose of the loan meets the CRA definition of 
community development (OCC, 2014). Second, the SBA guarantee mitigates the risk of the 
borrower’s default, at least for the guaranteed portion of the loan. The guarantee can therefore be 
attractive when making a loan to small businesses in LMI or minority neighborhoods where 
bankers are generally highly averse to lending. Moreover, the guaranteed portion of SBA loans 
can be sold into secondary markets, which allows banks to make additional profits depending on 
the rate and maturity of the loan and the market conditions at the time of sale (OCC, 2014).  
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4.3 Study Area Context  
This study focuses on the seven metropolitan areas that were consistently ranked as the 
10 largest metropolitan areas between 2010 and 2016 in terms of the number of establishments. 
The seven study areas included Atlanta–Sandy Springs–Roswell in the state of Georgia; 
Chicago–Naperville–Elgin in the states of Illinois–Indiana–Wisconsin; Los Angeles–Long 
Beach–Anaheim in California; Miami–Fort Lauderdale–West Palm Beach in Florida; New 
York–Newark–Jersey City in New York–New Jersey–Pennsylvania; Philadelphia–Camden–
Wilmington in Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Delaware–Maryland; and Washington–Arlington–
Alexandria in the District of Columbia–Victoria–Maryland–West Virginia. To examine the 
effects of the CRA on small business lending within, as well as across, the seven metropolitan 
areas, this study divides each metropolitan area into a central city, inner-ring suburbs, and outer-
ring suburbs based on the divisions indicated in prior studies (Jeong & Liu, 2019; S. Lee & 
Leigh, 2007; Liu & Painter, 2012). A central city refers to the oldest neighborhoods in the 
region, inner-ring suburbs are defined as older suburbs or first-ring suburbs, and outer-ring 
suburbs denote relatively new suburbs (Leigh & Lee, 2005). As shown in Table 4.2, the median 
age of the housing stocks in the central cities in this study are the oldest, and the housing stocks 
in the inner-ring suburbs were built later than those in the central cities but earlier than those in 
the outer-ring suburbs. Specifically, this study designated the District of Columbia, the City of 
Chicago, the City of Atlanta, the City of Miami, New York City, the City of Philadelphia, and 
the City of Los Angeles as the central cities according to the principal city definition of the 
Office of Management (2015). The spatial boundaries of the inner-ring suburbs were delineated 
using the first suburb methodology based on the age of the housing stock, the location, and the 
population (Puentes & Warren, 2006). The outer-ring suburbs comprise the balance of the 
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metropolitan region. Figure 4.1 identifies the central cities, inner-ring suburbs, and outer-ring 
suburbs of the seven metropolitan areas.  
 
Table 4.2 The median years houses were built in each metropolitan area 
 Central city Inner-ring Outer-ring 
Atlanta 1967 1979 1991 
Chicago 1947 1960 1974 
Los Angeles 1953 1960 1971 
Miami 1965 1971 1980 
New York 1948 1955 1965 
Philadelphia 1947 1960 1973 
Washington, DC 1951 1968 1984 
Note: Author’s calculation using the 2010 Decennial Census and the 2011–2016 American Community Survey data 
 
These seven metropolitan areas represent America’s urban areas in many ways, but they 
differ in terms of spatial structure, economic growth patterns, and business environments, 
including access to financial capital. First, the spatial structure of the metropolitan areas in the 
U.S. falls broadly into two categories: urban sprawl or compact city. Among the seven 
metropolitan areas, some are sprawled out, and some are built in compact ways. According to the 
Measuring Sprawl 2014 report by Smart Growth America, New York is the most compact 
metropolitan area in the U.S., whereas Atlanta was the second most sprawling area (Ewing & 
Hamidi, 2014). The list of highly compact areas included Chicago and Los Angeles, while the 
modestly compact areas included Miami, Philadelphia, and Washington DC (Ewing & Hamidi, 
2014).  
Second, the growth patterns for cities and suburbs vary by each metropolitan area. In all the 
metropolitan areas except Miami, city growth exceeded suburban growth between 2011 and 
2012 (Frey, 2019). However, there were only three metropolitan areas (i.e., Washington, Miami, 
and Los Angeles) where the cities grew faster than the suburbs between 2017 and 2018. Over the 
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same period, New York, Philadelphia, and Atlanta showed higher growth in the suburbs than in 
the cities, while Chicago reported negative growth in both the city and suburbs (Frey, 2019). 
Third, the growth of SBA loans and CRA LMI tracts also varies across and within 
metropolitan areas. As Table 4.3 illustrates, the number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses was 
higher in the central cities than the inner- or outer-ring suburbs in many metropolitan areas. In 
Chicago, for example, the central city had a higher number of SBA loans, both SBA 7(a) and 
SBA 504, per 1,000 businesses than the suburbs in 2010 and 2016, with the exception of SBA 
504 loans in 2016. In the Atlanta and Los Angeles areas, the average number of SBA 7(a) loans 
per 1,000 businesses was also higher in the central cities, whereas the average number of SBA 
504 loans per 1,000 businesses was lower in the central cities than in the suburbs. However, 
interestingly, in the Philadelphia and Washington, DC, areas, the outer-ring suburbs had the 
highest volume of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses, while in Miami, the inner-ring suburbs had 
the highest number of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses. 
While the volume of SBA 504 loans declined in most metropolitan areas, particularly in the 
suburbs, between 2010 and 2016, the volume of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses increased 
in the outer-ring suburbs of the Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Miami metropolitan areas. 
For example, the average number of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses in the outer-ring 
suburbs doubled from 2.94 to 5.90 in Miami and increased by 91.67 percent, 74.71 percent, and 
47.56 percent for the Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Chicago areas, respectively.  
As shown in Table 4.3, across the seven metropolitan areas, the share of CRA-eligible census 
tracts was highest in the central cities, followed by the inner-ring suburbs, then the outer-ring 
suburbs. However, all central cities in the seven metropolitan areas experienced a decline in the 
proportion of CRA-eligible tracts. There was a 21.09 percent decline in Miami, an 18.89 percent 
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decline in Washington, DC, a 9.05 percent decline in Atlanta, an 8.66 percent decline in 
Philadelphia, a 2.88 percent decline in New York and Los Angeles, and a 0.35 percent decline in 
Chicago.  
 
Table 4.3 The growth in SBA loans and CRA designations by area, 2010–2016 
City 
 
SBA Loan/ 
CRA 
Central City Inner-Ring suburbs Outer-Ring Suburbs 
2010 2016 %Change 2010 2016 %Change 2010 2016 % Change 
Atlanta Total SBA  0.77 1.16 50.65% 0.79 1.06 34.18% 0.61 1.07 75.41% 
SBA 7(a) 7.09 10.87 53.30% 6.84 9.91 44.88% 5.16 9.89 91.67% 
SBA 504 0.64 0.74 15.63% 1.05 0.71 -32.38% 0.98 0.77 -21.43% 
% of CRA 66.22 60.23 -9.05% 37.77 40.25 6.57% 27.63 19.82 -28.27% 
Chicago Total SBA  0.85 0.84 -1.18% 0.61 0.72 18.03% 0.59 0.79 33.90% 
SBA 7(a) 7.03 7.68 9.25% 6.29 6.29 0.00% 4.5 6.64 47.56% 
SBA 504 1.48 0.73 -50.68% 0.95 0.95 0.00% 1.44 1.27 -11.81% 
% of CRA 62.53 62.31 -0.35% 27.75 29.99 8.07% 22.86 21.09 -7.74% 
Los Angeles Total SBA  0.94 1.37 45.74% 0.93 1.28 37.63% 0.80 1.20 50.00% 
SBA 7(a) 8.12 12.43 53.08% 7.46 11.53 54.56% 6.09 10.64 74.71% 
SBA 504 1.28 1.30 1.56% 1.80 1.31 -27.22% 1.90 1.34 -29.47% 
% of CRA 55.89 54.28 -2.88% 34.46 34.67 0.61% 12.86 16.12 25.35% 
Miami Total SBA  0.51 0.58 13.73% 0.45 0.70 55.56% 0.40 0.66 65.00% 
SBA 7(a) 1.01 0.81 -19.80% 3.28 5.96 81.71% 2.94 5.90 100.68% 
SBA 504 4.06 4.97 22.41% 1.22 1.02 -16.39% 1.05 0.65 -38.10% 
% of CRA 85.71 67.65 -21.07% 41.92 38.50 -8.16% 27.42 27.53 0.40% 
New York Total SBA  0.49 0.55 12.24% 0.45 0.67 48.89% 0.48 0.67 39.58% 
SBA 7(a) 4.34 5.19 19.59% 4.14 6.43 55.31% 4.31 6.31 46.40% 
SBA 504 0.53 0.30 -43.40% 0.40 0.26 -35.00% 0.53 0.37 -30.19% 
% of CRA 49.60 48.17 -2.88% 32.89 32.80 -0.27% 10.54 15.13 43.55% 
Philadelphia Total SBA  0.48 0.91 89.58% 0.50 0.80 60.00% 0.68 0.91 33.82% 
SBA 7(a) 4.64 8.85 90.73% 4.55 7.69 69.01% 6.02 8.67 44.02% 
SBA 504 0.16 0.27 68.75% 0.41 0.35 -14.63% 0.82 0.44 -46.34% 
% of CRA 78.06 71.30 -8.66% 19.57 21.16 8.12% 11.01 9.69 -11.99% 
District of 
Columbia 
Total SBA  0.47 0.60 27.66% 0.50 0.58 16.00% 0.68 0.68 0.00% 
SBA 7(a) 3.96 5.54 39.90% 4.49 5.44 21.16% 5.69 6.31 10.90% 
SBA 504 0.71 0.48 -32.39% 0.55 0.35 -36.36% 1.09 0.47 -56.88% 
% of CRA 61.29 49.71 -18.89% 34.43 33.27 -3.37% 18.57 20.66 11.25% 
Note: SBA statistics indicate that the average number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses in a census tract, and the % 
of CRA represents the share of CRA eligible tract.   
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Figure 4.1 Ring delineation for the seven metropolitan statistical areas 
 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 
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Figure 4.1 (continued) 
Central city 
Inner-ring suburbs 
Outer-ring suburbs 
County boundary 
Legend 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 
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4.4 Data and Methodology  
4.4.1 Data  
This paper set up a panel data set for the years 2010 to 2016, where the main unit of 
observation is the census tract year. The data on SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504 loans were 
obtained from the SBA. The individual SBA loans data include a rich set of variables, such as 
the loan amount, loan date, North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code, 
lender information, and the precise location of each business for Geographic Information System 
(GIS) analysis. Using the census geocoding service of “Address Batch,” the individual loan data 
were aggregated at a census tract level. The market-level deposit and bank branch data are taken 
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)’s Summary of Deposits database. 
Additionally, the data on neighborhood characteristics were obtained from various sources, 
including the U.S. Decennial Census, American Community Survey (ACS), and County 
Business Pattern (CBP).  
4.4.2 Methodology  
A regression discontinuity (RD) design is a quasi-experimental design that evaluates the 
impact of an intervention or a treatment by comparing observations just above and below the 
threshold. The RD design  has the advantage of yielding an unbiased estimate of local treatment 
effect as good as a randomized experiment when properly implemented and analyzed (Cattaneo, 
Titiunik, & Vazquez-Bare, 2017; Lee & Lemieux, 2010). The CRA has a clear eligibility 
threshold: census tracts with a median family income less than 80 percent of the MSA median 
family income qualify as LMI areas and are targeted by banks. Therefore, to examine the effects 
of the CRA on SBA lending, this study uses an RD design in line with several papers in the 
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literature that used this approach to assess the CRA’s impacts (Avery et al., 2003; Berry & Lee, 
2007; Bostic & Lee, 2017; Fitzgerald & Vitello, 2014; Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2008). 
The model is specified as follows:  
yijk = 𝛽1 CRAijk + 𝛽2 Central cityij + 𝛽3 Inner-ringij + 𝛽4 CRA × Central cityijk + 𝛽5 CRA × 
Inner-ringijk + 𝛾 Xijk-1 + j + 𝜔k + εijk   
where yijk is the number of SBA-guaranteed loans per 1,000 businesses
6 and includes 
both the 7(a) and 504 loans in census tract i in the MSA j in year k. CRAijk is an indicator that is 
equal to 1 if a census tract i in the MSA j is a CRA-eligible neighborhood in year k, and the 
indicator is otherwise equal to 0. Central cityij equals to one if a census tract i is a central city of 
the MSA j. Inner-ringij equals to one if a census tract i is inner-ring suburbs of the MSA j. The 
variable CRA × Central cityijk is an interaction term that is equal to CRA indicator times, and the 
dummy variables indicate the central city. The variable CRA × Inner-ringijk is an interaction term 
that is equal to CRA indicator times, and the dummy variables indicate the inner-ring suburbs. 
All the covariates are included in Xijk-1. The model also includes the MSA fixed effects (j) and 
the year fixed effects (𝜔k) to control for any year- and location-specific heterogeneities.  
The RD design assumes that observations just above and just below the thresholds are 
continuous in terms of all the characteristics, with the exception of CRA designation (Fitzgerald 
& Vitello, 2014). The threshold is the median family income ratio of the census tract to that of 
the MSA. For brevity, this study refers to this threshold as the median family income ratio 
(MFI). This suggests that any discontinuity between census tracts where the median household 
income is barely less than 80 percent of the MSA and census tracts where the median income is 
 
6 Some studies employed the dollar value of SBA loans as a measure of SBA lending activities (Bostic & Lee, 
2017). This study, however, prefers the number of SBA loans over the dollar amount because the aim of this study is 
to evaluate whether the CRA increased the availability of SBA loans.   
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barely higher than 80 percent of the MSA can be attributed to a causal effect of the CRA. The 
MFI was used to test several bandwidths7 that measured the size of the sample interval around 
the prediction point (Berry & Lee, 2007; Bostic & Lee, 2017; Cattaneo et al., 2017; Fitzgerald & 
Vitello, 2014; Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2008). The treatment group consists of the census tracts 
designated as CRAs, and the control group is comprised of the non-CRA designated census 
tracts within the seven MSAs. The outcome of interest is government-guaranteed small business 
lending, which was calculated as the number of SBA-guaranteed small business loans per 1,000 
businesses in a census tract.   
In RD design, including variables other than the MFI is not necessary to obtain correct 
estimates under the continuity assumption (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). However, this study includes 
several predetermined covariates to help control for any observable differences between the 
census tracts, improve the precision of the estimations, and investigate the plausibility of the RD 
design (Berry & Lee, 2007; Cattaneo et al., 2017; Fitzgerald & Vitello, 2014; Lee & Lemieux, 
2010). Therefore, in line with previous studies (Avery et al., 2003; Berry & Lee, 2007; Bostic & 
Lee, 2017; Fitzgerald & Vitello, 2014; Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2008), the covariates that the author 
includes in this study are the total number of businesses, the share of small businesses, and the 
sector composition to measure the size and structure of local businesses. The number of bank 
branches and market-level deposit data are also included because a higher number of bank 
branches or higher deposit values could increase access to financial capital in the local market. 
The neighborhood characteristics included education, black share, Hispanic share, vacancy rate, 
and homeownership rate. Detailed descriptions of all the variables are presented in Table 4.4.  
 
7 In RD design, a larger bandwidth induced by including observations more distant from the thresholds increases 
bias but reduces variance because the number of observations is larger. On the other hand, a smaller bandwidth 
reduces bias but at the cost of precision (Cattaneo, Idrobo, & Titiunik, 2018). For this reason, the choice of 
bandwidth requires a “bias–variance” trade-off (Cattaneo et al., 2018, p. 45). 
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Table 4.4 Variable descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variables   
Total SBA  The number of total SBA loans per 1,000 businesses in each 
census tract 
Small 
Business 
Administration  SBA 7(a) The number of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses in each 
census tract 
SBA 504 The number of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 businesses in each 
census tract 
Key independent variable   
CRA An indicator variable equal to 1 if a census tract is eligible for the 
CRA; otherwise, 0  
  
Central city An indicator variable equal to 1 if a census tract is a central city 
of the MSA; otherwise, 0 
 
Inner-ring An indicator variable equal to 1 if a census tract is inner-ring 
suburbs of the MSA; otherwise, 0 
 
Other controls    
Total businesses (log) The total number of businesses in a census tract County 
Business Pattern 
2010-2016 
Share of businesses with 
employees 20 or less 
The share of firms with 20 employees or less 
Share of retail  The share of employees working in the retail/trade sector 2010 Decennial 
Census; 2011–
2016 American 
Community 
Survey 
Share of transportation  The share of employees working in the transportation and 
warehousing sectors 
Share of service  The share of employees working in the accommodation and food 
service sectors  
Share of bachelor’s degree 
or above 
The share of the population over the age of 25 with at least four 
years of college education 
Black share The share of the black population  
Hispanic share The share of the Hispanic population  
Ownership rate The share of homeowners  
Vacancy rate The share of vacant housing units  
Number of bank branches 
(log) 
The total number of FDIC-insured bank branches  Federal Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation Total bank deposits (log) The total dollar value of FDIC-insured bank deposits 
 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics for SBA lending and the other covariate 
variables used in the analysis. The first column shows the mean value for all the census tracts in 
the seven metropolitan areas. The second and third columns represent the mean value for the 
census tracts just below (0.7–0.8) and just above (0.8–0.9) the LMI threshold, respectively.  
 
77 
 
The number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses was higher in the census tracts just below the 
threshold than in those just above the threshold. This indicates that CRA-eligible tracts have a 
higher volume of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses than CRA-noneligible tracts, which suggests 
that the difference in loan outcomes may be attributable to the CRA. Moreover, it is worth noting 
that the number of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses was approximately 7 times higher than 
the number of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 businesses. This is probably because SBA 7(a) can be 
used more generally than SBA 504. Notably, the SBA 7(a) program is used to finance working 
capital and to buy businesses, real estate, or equipment, whereas the SBA 504 program is limited 
to financing major fixed assets such as land, existing buildings, and facilities. To account for the 
differences between the programs, this study estimates the effects of the CRA on SBA lending 
for both the SBA 7(a) and 504 programs.  
Table 4.5 shows that the CRA-eligible tracts had fewer businesses but a higher share of 
businesses with 20 employees or less than the CRA-noneligible tracts, although the difference 
was small. There was also a small difference in the share of businesses in the retail, 
transportation, and service sectors between the CRA-eligible and CRA-noneligible tracts. 
However, the CRA-eligible tracts tend to have a higher share of black or Hispanic populations 
and slightly lower values for the indicators representing the neighborhood’s socioeconomic 
status, such as the college graduate rate, homeownership rate, number of bank branches, or total 
bank deposit value. The CRA-eligible group accounts for 32.8 percent in the central cities, 39.0 
percent in the inner-ring suburbs, and 28.2 percent in the outer-ring suburbs. On the other hand, 
the CRA-noneligible group constitutes 28.5 percent in the central cities, 36.5 percent in the 
inner-ring suburbs, and 35.0 percent in the outer-ring suburbs.       
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics for SBA lending and the other covariate variables 
Variable All samples 
MFI Ratio Bin 
[0.7, 0.8] 
MFI Ratio Bin 
[0.8, 0.9] 
Number of all SBA loans per 1,000 
businesses  
0.698 (0.516) 0.741 (0.552) 0.732 (0.542) 
Number of 7a loans per 1,000 businesses 6.107 (4.665) 6.404 (4.927) 6.345 (4.917) 
Number of 504 loans per 1,000 businesses 0.875 (1.439) 1.001 (1.534) 0.972 (1.545) 
Total number of businesses (log)  4.461 (0.814) 4.312 (0.734) 4.385 (0.753) 
Share of firm with employees 20 or less 0.879 (0.045) 0.878 (0.480) 0.877 (0.048) 
Share of retail industry 0.107 (0.045) 0.115 (0.445) 0.113 (0.044) 
Share of transportation industry 0.056 (0.039) 0.066 (0.039) 0.063 (0.039) 
Share of service industry 0.092 (0.052) 0.105 (0.054) 0.099 (0.050) 
Share of bachelor’s degree or above 0.332 (0.176) 0.252 (0.123) 0.282 (0.127) 
Black share 0.187 (0.272) 0.229 (0.279) 0.188 (0.253) 
Hispanic share 0.248 (0.257) 0.345 (0.260) 0.305 (0.283) 
Ownership rate 0.591 (0.268) 0.486 (0.203) 0.551 (0.202) 
Vacancy rate 0.089 (0.080) 0.094 (0.065) 0.879 (0.066) 
Number of bank branches (log) 0.694 (0.450) 0.607 (0.400) 0.650 (0.416) 
Total bank deposits (log) 10.720 (1.930) 10.477 (1.783) 10.604 (1.823) 
Income ratio 1.073 (0.522) 0.750 (0.029) 0.850 (0.029) 
Central city 0.276 (0.447) 0.328 (0.470) 0.285 (0.451) 
Inner ring 0.350 (0.477) 0.390 (0.488) 0.365 (0.482) 
Outer ring 0.375 (0.484) 0.282 (0.450) 0.350 (0.477) 
N 105,055 8,753 9,105 
 
 
4.5.2 Testing the Identification Assumption  
This section describes the tests conducted to determine whether all the tract 
characteristics affecting SBA lending (other than CRA-eligibility status) changed smoothly 
across the threshold because this is the core assumption of the RD design. As discussed, the 
results of the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.5 highlight the differences between the 
CRA-eligible and CRA-noneligible tracts for some characteristics. However, they do not reveal 
obvious discontinuity at the threshold. This study therefore tests the assumption using both 
graphical and statistical analyses. Figure 4.2 plots the predicted values from a regression of the 
number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses on the set of one-year lagged tract characteristics 
listed in Table 4.2. Each data point shown in Figure 4.2 represents the mean of the predicted 
values for the tracts, and the lines in each panel represent the cubic fits through the points, 
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separately estimated on either side of the 0.8 threshold. While most baseline covariates evolved 
smoothly through the cutoff, some required further statistical investigation to reach a formal 
conclusion. Table 4.6 presents the results of an identification test for all the covariates in Figure 
4.2. No statistically significant difference between the census tracts just below and above the 
threshold for all the covariates gives credence to the RD design. The results show that all 95% 
robust confidence intervals contained 0, with p-values ranging from 0.187 to 0.995. In other 
words, there is no empirical evidence that, at the cutoff, the CRA-eligible and CRA-noneligible 
tracts differed systematically for these covariates.  
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Figure 4.2 RD plots for the predetermined covariates   
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Figure 4.2 (continued)  
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Table 4.6 Results of the RD identification test 
Variable 
MSE-Optimal 
Bandwidth 
RD Estimator p-value Conf. Int. 
Eff. Number 
Observations 
Log number of businesses 0.042 -0.029 0.452 [-0.105, 0.047] 7507 
Share of businesses with 20 
employees or less 
0.022 -0.282 0.388 [-0.922, 0.358] 3924 
Share of retail industry 0.046 0.351 0.187 [-0.170, 0.872] 5283 
Share of transportation 0.028 0.289 0.245 [-0.198, 0.775] 4946 
Share of service industry 0.029 -0.526 0.486 [-0.626, 0.630] 5174 
Share of bachelor’s degree of 
above 
0.029 -0.526 0.486 [-2.006, 0.954] 5128 
Black share 0.023 0.016 0.384 [-0.020, 0.052] 4147 
Hispanic share 0.018 -0.036 0.097 [-0.079, 0.007] 3144 
Ownership rate 0.022 -0.010 0.476 [-0.038, 0.179] 3941 
Vacancy rate 0.032 0.102 0.784 [-0.629, 0.833] 5784 
Log number of bank branches 0.041 -0.026 0.225 [-0.068, 0.016] 7349 
Log total bank deposits 0.032 0.020 0.844 [-0.176, 0.216] 5675 
Note: The number of observations used in the analysis varies for each covariate; this occurs because the MSE-
optimal bandwidth is different for every covariate analyzed.  
 
 
4.5.3 RD estimates of the CRA’s effect on SBA lending  
Table 4.7 presents the results of the CRA’s effects on the number of all SBA loans per 
1,000 businesses. All the regressions were repeated for four different samples of census tracts. 
The first column of Table 4.7 includes all the census tracts in the seven metropolitan areas for the 
purpose of comparison with the RD estimates. The second column includes only the tracts for 
which the median family income was within 10 percent of the threshold, while the third and the 
fourth columns include the tracts for which income was within five percent or three percent of 
the threshold, respectively. This sample design is repeated in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 where the focus 
is on the impact of CRA tract status on SBA 7(a) and 504 loans. Table 4.10 presents the results 
of a repeat of the exercise for each metropolitan area but includes only the samples within 10 
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percent of the threshold because of space limitations. All the regressions included covariates8, 
year-fixed effects, and metropolitan-fixed effects.  
Before turning to the main relationships of interest, it is important to understand the 
relationship between SBA lending and the covariates. Table 4.7 shows that the coefficient 
estimates and their statistical significances were largely consistent across the models with 
different bandwidths. While most of the relationships were consistent with those delineated in 
past studies (Bostic & Lee, 2017), some findings were somewhat surprising. In particular, the 
literature on the effects of the CRA on mortgage lending suggests that black and Hispanic 
neighborhoods have lower access to bank credit (Bates & Robb, 2015, 2016; Immergluck, 2002). 
However, this study found that census tracts with a higher share of black or Hispanic populations 
had a higher number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses. While the results ostensibly look 
contradictory, this is unlikely because a higher volume of SBA lending implies that many small 
businesses in black or Hispanic neighborhoods do not have alternative financial sources other 
than federal-guaranteed SBA loans. Furthermore, according to the 2014 Annual Survey of 
Entrepreneurs, black and Hispanic business owners use fewer business loans from banks or 
financial institutions than white business owners and instead rely more heavily on government-
guaranteed business loans as sources of start-up financing (Robb, 2018). This statistic confirms 
the current finding.  
In general, large-sized banks are more likely to provide small business loans than small-sized 
banks (Small Business Administration, 2018). However, interestingly, this study found that 
census tracts with a higher value of FDIC-insured bank deposits had lower SBA loans per 1,000 
 
8 The author also tested all the regressions without covariates because some researchers have argued that covariates 
are not necessary in RD design. The size of the coefficients changed slightly, but not the direction or the significance 
level in most cases. Therefore, this study focused on the results of the analyses that included covariates.   
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businesses. This may be because census tracts with higher bank deposit values tend to be wealthy 
neighborhoods where the demand for SBA loans is low. In terms of the other covariates, the 
results showed that the total number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses was higher in the census 
tracts with more business establishments, a higher share of businesses in the retail and 
transportation sectors, and more residents with college degrees. However, the number of SBA 
loans per 1,000 businesses was lower in the census tracts with a higher share of businesses with 
20 employees or less and higher vacancy rates. 
 
The effects of the CRA on all SBA lending by metropolitan ring  
As shown in Table 4.7, the main variables of interest are the CRA, intrametropolitan 
location, and their interaction terms. Using the CRA-ineligible outer-ring suburbs as the omitted 
reference group, the statistics revealed the relative effects of the CRA on SBA lending. The 
results from the full samples showed that CRA coverage was positively related to SBA lending 
in the central cities and inner-ring suburbs. However, the RD results provided little evidence that 
CRA coverage increased SBA lending, while there was some heterogeneity by metropolitan 
rings. The difference in the results between the full samples and the RD samples suggests that 
the estimates from the full samples may be misleading. This study therefore focused on the 
results of the RD analysis. As shown in columns 2–4 of Table 4.7, the coefficient of the CRA 
was negative. This suggests that the CRA-eligible census tracts in the outer-ring suburbs had 
lower SBA lending than the CRA-noneligible tracts. However, the relationship is only significant 
for the census tracts where the median family income was within 10 percent of the threshold, and 
the effects disappeared when the samples were limited to census tracts where the median family 
income was within three or five percent of the 80 percent MFI ratio. These findings of 
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nonsignificance in column 3 and 4 may be because smaller sample sizes increase standard errors, 
thus increasing the potential of Type II error. In terms of the inner-ring suburbs, this study finds 
that the CRA had a positive effect on SBA lending. Specifically, the CRA designation increased 
the total number of SBA loans by 0.007 per 1,000 businesses in the inner-ring suburbs given that 
the coefficient on the CRA is -0.032 and the coefficient on the CRA × Inner-ring is 0.039. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.7 show, however, that the effects were not significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table 4.7 RD results of the CRA’s effects on SBA lending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All samples MFI ratio 
[0.7, 0.9] 
MFI ratio 
[0.75, 0.85] 
MFI ratio 
[0.77, 0.83] 
CRA -0.048*** -0.032* -0.018 -0.037 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.023) (0.029) 
Central city 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.021) (0.026) 
Inner ring -0.036*** 0.004 -0.003 0.018 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.019) (0.023) 
CRA × Central city 0.043*** 0.016 0.023 0.038 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) 
CRA × Inner ring 0.083*** 0.039** 0.022 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.023) (0.029) 
Log number of businesses 0.008* 0.031*** 0.033** 0.049*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) 
Share of businesses with employees 20 or less -0.722*** -0.826*** -0.881*** -0.949*** 
 (0.051) (0.113) (0.148) (0.178) 
Share of retail industry 0.158*** 0.190** 0.296** 0.231 
 (0.038) (0.092) (0.128) (0.158) 
Share of transportation industry 0.156*** 0.218* 0.232 0.178 
 (0.049) (0.115) (0.158) (0.194) 
Share of service industry -0.107*** -0.028 -0.124 -0.233* 
 (0.035) (0.084) (0.114) (0.140) 
Share of bachelor’s degree or above 0.088*** 0.118*** 0.061 0.096 
 (0.012) (0.040) (0.057) (0.070) 
Black share -0.008 0.058** 0.034* 0.064* 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.019) (0.036) 
Hispanic share 0.229*** 0.150*** 0.121*** 0.155*** 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.032) (0.039) 
Ownership rate 0.039*** 0.039 0.010 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.036) (0.044) 
Vacancy rate -0.279*** -0.264*** -0.307*** -0.305*** 
 (0.026) (0.069) (0.095) (0.114) 
Log number of bank branches 0.003 -0.030 -0.043 -0.087** 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.028) (0.034) 
Log total bank deposit -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.008 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
MFI Income ratio -0.049*** -0.099 0.134 -0.852 
 (0.006) (0.117) (0.321) (0.674) 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
MSA fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.510*** 1.460*** 1.344*** 1.965*** 
 (0.055) (0.159) (0.310) (0.583) 
Observations 105,055 17,858 8,979 5,380 
Note: The table reports RD estimates from four separate regressions. Column heading corresponds to the sample, with columns 
(1) presenting results for the full census tracts in seven metro areas, columns (2) through (4) representing census tracts in which 
their median family income ratio (MFI) is within the range specified in the square brackets. Dependent variable is the number of 
all SBA lending per 1,000 businesses in a census tract. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1 
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The effects of the CRA on SBA 7(a) and 504 by metropolitan ring  
As discussed previously, the SBA 7(a) and 504 programs differ in terms of their 
purposes, loan sizes, interest rates, and terms. This study therefore analyzes the effects of the 
CRA on SBA 7(a) and SBA 504. Table 4.8 shows the results of the CRA’s effects on the number 
of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses, while Table 4.9 shows the results of the CRA’s effects 
on the number of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 businesses. As demonstrated in Table 4.8, this study 
found no evidence to suggest that the CRA has a positive impact on SBA 7(a) lending in LMI 
neighborhoods. However, the findings presented in Table 4.9 suggest that the CRA increases 
SBA 504 lending in these neighborhoods. Specifically, the coefficient of the CRA × Inner-ring 
is positive and significant in column 2 although the coefficient of the inner-ring suburbs is 
negative and significant across all the models in Table 4.9. These findings suggest that the 
number of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 businesses was higher in the CRA-eligible tracts than in the 
CRA-ineligible tracts. In the case of the central cities, the findings in column 4 suggest that the 
CRA has a positive effect on SBA 504 lending. While there may be several reasons for the 
increase in SBA 504 lending with the CRA, one possible explanation is that the 504 program is 
more focused on community development, including job creation and retention, than the 7(a) 
program. Accordingly, there is a high probability that institutions granting 504 loans will receive 
CRA consideration, which may provide an incentive for banks to increase SBA 504 lending. 
However, the results in column 2 show that the LMI census tracts in the outer-ring suburbs still 
had lower 504 lending activity despite CRA coverage. Taken together, the findings suggest that 
the effects of CRA coverage on SBA lending can vary by metropolitan ring.   
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Table 4.8 RD results of CRA’s effects on SBA 7(a) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All samples MFI ratio  
[0.7, 0.9] 
MFI ratio  
[0.75, 0.85] 
MFI ratio 
[0.77, 0.83] 
CRA -0.401*** -0.229 -0.131 -0.319 
 (0.073) (0.157) (0.217) (0.272) 
Central city 0.115* 0.076 0.034 0.099 
 (0.066) (0.145) (0.197) (0.241) 
Inner ring -0.174*** 0.160 0.089 0.311 
 (0.050) (0.126) (0.173) (0.212) 
CRA × Central city 0.435*** 0.139 0.180 0.250 
 (0.091) (0.169) (0.227) (0.282) 
CRA × Inner ring 0.619*** 0.250 0.147 -0.095 
 (0.089) (0.161) (0.215) (0.267) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
MSA fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Constant 10.636*** 9.090*** 7.816*** 13.592** 
 (0.494) (1.449) (2.871) (5.397) 
Observations 105,055 17,858 8,979 5,380 
Note: The table reports RD estimates from four separate regressions. Column heading corresponds to the sample, with columns 
(1) presenting results for the full census tracts in seven metro areas, columns (2) through (4) representing census tracts in which 
their median family income ratio (MFI) is within the range specified in the square brackets. Dependent variable is the number of 
SBA 7(a) lending per 1,000 businesses in a census tract. Control variables include total number of businesses, firm size, 
industrial composition, education, black and Hispanic share, ownership rate, vacancy rate, number of bank branches, total amount 
of bank deposit, and income ratio. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Table 4.9 RD results of CRA’s effects on SBA 504 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All samples MFI ratio  
[0.7, 0.9] 
MFI ratio  
[0.75, 0.85] 
MFI ratio 
[0.77, 0.83] 
CRA -0.093*** -0.089* -0.041 -0.056 
 (0.023) (0.050) (0.069) (0.089) 
Central city -0.089*** 0.010 -0.015 -0.105 
 (0.021) (0.044) (0.058) (0.072) 
Inner ring -0.183*** -0.138*** -0.143*** -0.187*** 
 (0.015) (0.038) (0.051) (0.063) 
CRA × Central city 0.024 0.041 0.063 0.167* 
 (0.029) (0.053) (0.071) (0.091) 
CRA × Inner ring 0.243*** 0.164*** 0.088 0.116 
 (0.028) (0.050) (0.068) (0.087) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
MSA fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Constant 4.765*** 5.743*** 5.819*** 5.617*** 
 (0.155) (0.443) (0.884) (1.737) 
Observations 105,055 17,858 8,979 5,380 
Note: The table reports RD estimates from four separate regressions. Column heading corresponds to the sample, with columns 
(1) presenting results for the full census tracts in seven metro areas, columns (2) through (4) representing census tracts in which 
their median family income ratio (MFI) is within the range specified in the square brackets. Dependent variable is the number of 
SBA 504 lending per 1,000 businesses in a census tract. Control variables include total number of businesses, firm size, industrial 
composition, education, black and Hispanic share, ownership rate, vacancy rate, number of bank branches, total amount of bank 
deposit, and income ratio. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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The effects of the CRA on SBA lending by metropolitan area  
Table 4.10 presents the results of the CRA’s effects on SBA lending for the seven 
metropolitan areas. Panel A shows the results of the total SBA loans, while panels B and C 
present the results of the SBA 7(a) and 504 programs, respectively.   
Overall, the findings in panel A suggest that the CRA had a minimal effect on increasing the 
total number of SBA loans. However, the results varied across and within the metropolitan areas. 
In particular, Table 4.10 shows that the CRA had no positive effect on the total number of SBA 
loans for the central cities and outer-ring suburbs in any of the metropolitan areas. In Atlanta and 
Philadelphia, there was no significant difference in SBA lending activity across the metropolitan 
rings. The results also showed that the CRA had no effect on SBA loans in the Chicago, New 
York, and Washington DC areas. However, this study found some evidence of the effect of the 
CRA on SBA lending in the inner-ring suburbs of Los Angeles and Miami.  
Similar to the results in Table 4.8, the results in panel B show that the CRA had no effect on 
the 7(a) programs in any of the metropolitan areas except the inner-ring suburbs of Los Angeles. 
In terms of the SBA 504 program, this study found some interesting variations across the 
metropolitan areas (panel C). CRA coverage had no significant effect on the number of SBA 504 
loans across the metropolitan rings of Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and Washington, 
DC. However, in Chicago, the number of 504 loans per 1,000 businesses was higher in the CRA-
eligible tracts in the central city and inner-ring suburbs, but 504 lending activity was low in the 
CRA-eligible tracts in the outer-ring suburbs despite the CRA. In contrast, in Philadelphia, the 
CRA had a positive effect on 504 lending in the outer-ring suburbs but a negative effect in the 
central city and inner-ring suburbs. 
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Table 4.10 RD results of CRA’s effects on SBA lending by MSA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Atlanta Chicago Los 
Angeles 
Miami New 
York 
Philadelphia Washington 
DC 
 Panel A: Total number of SBA lending per 1,000 businesses 
CRA -0.006 -0.018 -0.073* -0.036 -0.001 0.071 -0.033 
 (0.066) (0.038) (0.042) (0.033) (0.030) (0.076) (0.048) 
Central city 0.050 0.139*** 0.102** -0.042 -0.041 -0.068 -0.058 
 (0.142) (0.035) (0.042) (0.123) (0.026) (0.060) (0.057) 
Inner ring -0.025 -0.048* 0.015 0.038 0.065** -0.014 -0.131*** 
 (0.065) (0.028) (0.035) (0.031) (0.027) (0.049) (0.039) 
CRA × Central city 0.016 0.014 0.024 0.050 0.009 -0.124 -0.008 
 (0.160) (0.041) (0.050) (0.130) (0.029) (0.085) (0.065) 
CRA × Inner ring -0.003 0.011 0.112*** 0.058* -0.022 -0.006 0.012 
 (0.065) (0.038) (0.043) (0.033) (0.032) (0.076) (0.046) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.472* 1.042*** 1.938*** 0.891** 0.037 -0.364 0.383 
 (0.800) (0.336) (0.412) (0.414) (0.261) (0.600) (0.465) 
Observations 1,246 2,950 3,725 1,457 5,597 1,420 1,463 
 Panel B: Number of SBA 7(a) lending per 1,000 businesses 
CRA 0.193 0.091 -0.775** -0.220 -0.017 0.285 -0.376 
 (0.634) (0.344) (0.384) (0.286) (0.284) (0.737) (0.460) 
Central city 0.480 1.507*** 0.596 0.123 -0.336 -0.514 -0.992* 
 (1.331) (0.309) (0.365) (1.038) (0.252) (0.576) (0.547) 
Inner ring 0.046 0.057 0.003 0.203 0.658** -0.088 -1.126*** 
 (0.611) (0.247) (0.303) (0.261) (0.259) (0.469) (0.370) 
CRA × Central city 0.315 -0.036 0.353 0.013 0.108 -0.809 0.055 
 (1.520) (0.370) (0.452) (1.111) (0.276) (0.823) (0.620) 
CRA × Inner ring -0.235 -0.220 1.115*** 0.460 -0.253 0.236 0.065 
 (0.620) (0.338) (0.385) (0.280) (0.308) (0.739) (0.440) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 11.688 4.909* 10.030*** 2.443 -1.601 -4.467 1.199 
 (7.492) (2.980) (3.610) (3.465) (2.519) (5.792) (4.439) 
Observations 1,246 2,950 3,725 1,457 5,597 1,420 1,463 
 Panel C: Number of SBA 504 lending per 1,000 businesses 
CRA -0.229 -0.313** -0.056 -0.159 -0.013 0.420*** 0.073 
 (0.153) (0.138) (0.145) (0.132) (0.074) (0.139) (0.118) 
Central city 0.076 -0.158 0.383*** -0.497 -0.053 -0.161 0.380*** 
 (0.318) (0.120) (0.132) (0.488) (0.058) (0.109) (0.131) 
Inner ring -0.252* -0.558*** 0.065 0.178 -0.002 -0.056 -0.201** 
 (0.145) (0.096) (0.109) (0.123) (0.060) (0.088) (0.087) 
CRA × Central city -0.192 0.263* -0.046 0.471 -0.005 -0.436*** -0.136 
 (0.366) (0.147) (0.169) (0.518) (0.070) (0.155) (0.156) 
CRA × Inner ring 0.192 0.391*** 0.113 0.127 0.043 -0.298** 0.067 
 (0.150) (0.134) (0.144) (0.130) (0.079) (0.139) (0.109) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 3.016* 5.525*** 10.040*** 6.584*** 2.056*** 0.824 2.449** 
 (1.785) (1.172) (1.316) (1.642) (0.589) (1.092) (1.063) 
Observations 1,246 2,950 3,725 1,457 5,597 1,420 1,463 
Note: The table reports RD estimates for the seven metropolitan areas. All of the regressions are estimated using MFI ratio of 0.7 
to 0.9. Dependent variable in panel A is the number of all SBA lending per 1,000 businesses in a census tract. In panel B, 
dependent variable is the number of SBA 7(a) loans per 1,000 businesses. Dependent variable in panel C is the number of SBA 
504 lending per 1,000 businesses. Control variables include total number of businesses, firm size, industrial composition, 
education, black and Hispanic share, ownership rate, vacancy rate, number of bank branches, total amount of bank deposit, and 
income ratio. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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4.6 Discussion  
This study links two different but closely related policies—the CRA and SBA lending 
programs—and evaluates how the CRA influences SBA lending across and within seven 
metropolitan areas. Using an RD analysis, this study found little evidence that the CRA increases 
SBA lending in LMI neighborhoods, which is consistent with the findings of previous studies 
(Berry & Lee, 2007; Getter, 2020). However, when looking into the effects of CRA coverage by 
metropolitan ring and metropolitan area, there were some variations. Specifically, there was no 
significant difference in the number of SBA loans per 1,000 businesses, either for SBA 7(a) or 
504 loans, in the central cities of any metropolitan area except Chicago and Philadelphia. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Philadelphia, no evidence was found that the CRA has a 
positive effect on SBA loans in outer-ring suburbs. In inner-ring suburbs, however, this study 
found that the CRA increased the number of SBA 504 loans per 1,000 business overall, but 
among the seven MSAs, the effects were only significant in Chicago. While there may be 
various reasons, the significant effects of CRA on SBA 504 loans in Chicago and Philadelphia 
may be due to the higher proportion of manufactures in these regions (Immergluck & Mullen, 
1998). 
While this study found that the CRA had some positive effects on SBA loans, the overall 
results suggest that the incentives that the CRA generates are not sufficient for banks to increase 
credit to LMI neighborhoods. Furthermore, given the other incentives that exist simultaneously 
alongside the CRA, it is difficult to conclude that the increased loan volumes in LMI 
neighborhoods can be solely attributed to the CRA (Getter, 2020). Although the lack of credit 
availability in LMI neighborhoods can be explained by many factors, many scholars have argued 
that it is because of the difficulty in getting sufficient information about borrowers in LMI 
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neighborhoods (Lang & Nakamura, 1993; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). As discussed, the CRA was 
designed to address the need for credit in LMI neighborhoods by incentivizing financial 
institutions to grant loans to LMI borrowers, and SBA loans can be particularly attractive to 
lenders and borrowers compared to many of the other commercial loans available to small 
businesses. For lenders, the CRA can act as a shock absorber in the event of a borrower’s default, 
and the opportunity exists to receive CRA consideration when the loans support community 
development in particular, for example, through the SBA 504 program. For borrowers, SBA 
loans provide lower interest rates and conditions compared to other commercial loans. However, 
given that technological innovation in the information and financial sectors allows banks to 
better evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers, this argument may be outdated. Furthermore, 
given that the CRA is not a federal assistance program and several regulators have implemented 
it separately, no single federal agency is responsible for evaluating its overall effectiveness 
(Getter, 2020). Accordingly, the effects of the CRA may depend on how it is implemented rather 
than how it is designed.  
This study contributes to the literature by linking two policies that are different but closely 
related. To date, most previous studies have examined the effects of the CRA on the overall 
small business loans in the market (Bates & Robb, 2015; Bostic & Lee, 2017; Ding et al., 2018; 
Rupasingha & Wang, 2017). There has therefore been limited understanding of how the CRA 
influences government-guaranteed small business lending even though there are reasons to 
believe it does. This study is thus the first to examine the effects of the CRA on small business 
loans with a particular focus on SBA lending. Second, this study adds a spatial dimension to the 
discussion on the effects of the CRA on small business lending. Some previous studies have 
examined the geographic distribution of small business loans by income category or racial 
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composition (Canner, 1999; Immergluck, 2002; Smith, 2003). However, to the best of my 
knowledge, no study has investigated small business lending by different metropolitan rings such 
as the central cities and inner- and outer-ring suburbs. Lastly, this study provides a richer 
assessment of the effects of the CRA on SBA lending by separately estimating the effects by 
program and metropolitan area.  
While this study provides important insights into the small business credit market, it has 
some limitations. First, this study found that there were variations in the effects of the CRA on 
SBA lending across and within the seven metropolitan areas but did not test the mechanism 
underlying these findings. For example, why is the CRA effective in inner-ring suburbs? Why is 
it not effective in the central cities and outer-ring suburbs? Furthermore, the Philadelphia results 
were quite different from those of the other metropolitan areas. Why? The answers to these 
questions remain unresolved in this study, yet it is important to understand why the CRA works 
in some areas but not in others. Accordingly, further research may provide more insights into this 
issue by examining the mechanisms underlying the heterogenous effects of the CRA across and 
within metropolitan areas. Second, this study measured the CRA incentives as a binary variable. 
In line with many previous studies that used an RD design to estimate the effects of the CRA on 
lending, this study used the CRA’s clear eligibility status to divide the treatment and comparison 
groups. However, in practice, CRA incentives are not that simple. Indeed, the extent to which the 
CRA incentivizes banks’ lending decisions depends on many factors. For example, how tough 
are local banking regulators? How many banks receive CRA evaluations in the local market? 
Future works should therefore address these issues by measuring CRA incentive structures more 
precisely. Lastly, methodologically, the RD estimates have limited external validity—that is, the 
RD effect is generally not representative of the treatment effects for units with scores farther 
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away from the threshold. In other words, there is a likelihood that business environments, 
including access to capital, in tracts with median household incomes barely high or low from the 
cutoff differ systematically from those in tracts with median household incomes farther away 
from the cutoff. Therefore, the results presented herein should be interpreted with some caution. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
The three essays in this dissertation have all focused on small business lending policies in 
the U.S. and make several unique contributions to the literature. First, by examining small 
business lending programs at different administrative levels (i.e., national, county, and census 
tract), the three essays in this collection provide a more comprehensive and nuanced 
understanding of small business lending programs in the U.S. Second, although some studies 
have examined the effects of SBA lending by assessing community characteristics, the scope has 
been limited to the low–high-income continuum (Cortes, 2010; Craig et al., 2007). This 
dissertation adds race as an additional community dimension and pays particular attention to 
black and Hispanic neighborhoods. Third, this dissertation links two policies that are different 
but closely related. To date, most previous studies have investigated the effects of the CRA on 
the overall small business loans in the market (Bates & Robb, 2015; Bostic & Lee, 2017; Ding et 
al., 2018; Rupasingha & Wang, 2017). Given that SBA loans account for only a small proportion 
of total small business loans, there has been limited understanding of how the CRA influences 
government-guaranteed small business lending. While some previous studies have examined the 
geographic distribution of small business loans by income category or racial composition 
(Canner, 1999; Immergluck, 2002; Smith, 2003), to the best of my knowledge, no study has 
investigated small business lending by different metropolitan rings such as central cities and 
inner- and outer-ring suburbs. The essays in this dissertation therefore provide important insights 
that may assist policy makers in tailoring SBA programs based on communities’ characteristics 
in a changing financial landscape. 
Since detailed findings are discussed at the end of each chapter, I conclude this 
dissertation by highlighting the major themes that emerged from these studies and point to 
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possible directions for future research along the way. First, in this dissertation, the primary 
measure of the performance of the SBA loan programs was the number of loans per business in a 
specified geographic unit. While the count measure is straightforward and easy to understand, it 
is not sufficient to capture the dynamics of the small business credit market. For instance, even 
with the same number of SBA loans per business, the credit market conditions each 
neighborhood faces may vary substantially if they have, for example, different interest rates, 
guaranteed rates, and/or default rates. Accordingly, future studies should use other indicators to 
measure the performance of SBA loans to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
programs’ effects and further help identify adjustments that may improve the programs’ results.  
Second, evidence suggests that macroeconomic conditions have a substantial impact on 
credit markets and the small business sector (Bostic & Lee, 2017). This dissertation focused on 
the post-recession period between 2010 and 2015 and assumed that the demand and supply of 
small business loans and their impact on the local economy were not the same as those before or 
during the recession, which were the periods most previous studies addressed. While some of the 
differences in the findings between this dissertation and prior studies cannot be solely attributed 
to the macroeconomic situation, its role also cannot be ruled out. While writing this dissertation, 
on March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the coronavirus outbreak a 
pandemic (Ducharme, 2020). As the country hardest hit by the coronavirus globally, the federal 
and state governments of the U.S. took action to legally enforce “social distancing” in order to 
slow the spread of the virus. This included aggressive moves to shut down local businesses for 
30 days or more (Duncan & Sonmez, 2020). Since many small businesses have relatively little 
cash on hand, the quarantine has caused them considerable financial distress. As a response to 
this challenging time, on March 27, 2020, President Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
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and Economic Security Act, which allocated $376 billion to help small businesses keep their 
workers employed as part of SBA loan programs (Cowley, 2020). After the country overcomes 
this challenge, researchers should examine how the government funding was allocated (e.g., who 
received the loans, who did not, and why) and how effective the SBA loan programs were in 
helping the small business sector. Such studies will help improve accountability to stakeholders 
and provide further insights into how to improve the planning and implementation of these 
programs.  
Finally, in reviewing the literature on small business lending, I found that little attention 
was paid to understanding the implementation process even though it is as important as the 
policy design. For example, the CRA was designed to reduce discriminatory credit practices 
against businesses in LMI neighborhoods. However, it is not entirely clear whether CRA 
examiners pay sufficient attention to who receives the loans in LMI neighborhoods. Banks may 
receive credit as long as the borrowers are located in LMI neighborhoods but seemingly 
irrespective of the financial status of these borrowers. In other words, banks may have an 
incentive to seek out the most creditworthy borrowers in LMI neighborhoods instead of those 
who need loans the most. In so doing, SBA loan programs may appear at face value to be highly 
effective. Future works should therefore address these issues by examining the implementation 
process more precisely.  
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